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Frames in the U.S. Print Media Coverage of the Kashmir Conflict 
 
Durga Ray 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study examined the frames used by the U.S. print media – The New York 
Times, The Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times – in their coverage of the 
Kashmir conflict and the parties involved in it from 1989 to 2003. It divided the 15-year 
period of coverage into four phases – 1989-1990, 1991-1998, 1999-2001, and 2002-2003 
– and focused on the coverage of seven subjects. It then identified sources and keywords 
from 180 news reports and placed them into categories from which it isolated thematic 
clusters or frames. 
The study found that in the first two phases, the conflict was described as a 
violent Kashmiri separatist movement, a frame that changed to one depicting it as 
ongoing violent conflict between India and Pakistan. In all phases, Kashmiris were 
predominantly identified as armed militants fighting for secession of Kashmir from India, 
a goal that decreased in prominence in the last two phases. India was depicted initially as 
a country suppressing the rebellion in Kashmir through violent means with the help of its 
armed forces, a frame that shifted later to a military force fighting Pakistani troops and 
non-Kashmiri Islamic fighters. Pakistan was consistently identified as a country 
supporting the Kashmiri separatist movement with arms and training, and later as a 
  vi
country itself participating in the conflict through its military. The United States was 
consistently described as a country concerned with peace and security in South Asia. The 
dominant frames in all periods were found to be portraying the conflict as a war and in 
the last two phases, a potential nuclear war. The Indians, Pakistanis and Kashmiris were 
always characterized through their religious identities – Indians as Hindu, and Pakistanis 
and Kashmiris as Muslim or Islamic. Official sources were consistently greater in number 
than unofficial sources for India, Pakistan and the United States but for Kashmiris, 
unofficial sources scored over official ones in all four periods. 
  1
 
 
 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
The mass media have been shown to have a significant impact on what issues the 
public thinks about and how it thinks about them. Two of these effects of the mass media 
are embodied in the theories of agenda setting (McCombs and Shaw, 1972) and framing 
(Gamson, 1989; Goffman, 1974; Graber, 1988; Entman, 1989; Tuchman, 1978) 
respectively. In the works of the above experts on it and many of the other researchers 
who have investigated it, framing has been advanced as a theory that applies to the 
different stages of the mass communications process – message formation, transmission, 
and assimilation. 
Past research in international mass communication has shown the media are very 
influential in setting the public agenda with regard to foreign nations. Indeed, for the 
American public, not only are the media the chief sources of information about foreign 
affairs, prestige newspapers such as The New York Times, The Washington Post and the 
Los Angeles Times are also sources of information for foreign policy elites, including 
government officials (Graber, 1980). In a survey of 629 randomly selected residents of 
Dade County, Florida, Salwen and Matera (1992) found a distinct agenda-setting 
influence of the news media regarding perceptions about foreign countries. Their results 
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indicated evidence in the form of changes in public assessments of foreign nations as 
dangerous places in relation to media coverage of those nations. The public also provided 
an accurate assessment of the relative frequency of coverage given to each country in the 
U.S. media. Since the media are the major sources of information about foreign nations 
for U.S. audiences, it can be argued that the specific information contained in media 
messages (frames) are also transferred to people, so that they have a media-induced 
problem definition, sense of moral responsibility, and treatment recommendation for 
whatever is happening in a particular foreign country. It is this ability of the media 
through their use of frames to tell people how to think about something that makes the 
study of frames very important. 
Kashmir has been a flashpoint in relations between India and Pakistan since their 
independence from British rule in 1947. In the past 56 years, the two nuclear-capable 
countries have fought four wars, three of which have centered on Kashmir. As recently as 
the summer of 2002, the two nations were almost on the brink of war and had amassed 
millions of troops on their mutual border after an attack by a group of gunmen from the 
Kashmiri separatist group Lashkar-e-Toiba on India’s Parliament Building on December 
13, 2001.  
This study will attempt to identify and analyze the terms that have been used by 
the U.S. media to describe the conflict and the different parties to it – India, Pakistan, and 
the people of Kashmir. It also will look at whether and how these frames have changed 
over the years as the conflict has evolved and different actors have entered and exited the 
scene. In addition, it will attempt to place the changes in the frames, if any, in the context 
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of changes occurring in the relationship between India and Pakistan, in global events and 
in international equations. 
Since international events are outside the direct experience of most people who 
depend on the mass media for information on foreign affairs, it is important to determine 
to what degree bias is reflected in news reporting because “legislators, as well as the 
public, may form negative or positive stereotypes of a country based on media portrayal 
that is disproportionate and distorted” (Dickson, 1992). In order to understand whether 
the press revealed a bias for or against the U.S. government vis-à-vis the US-Sandinista 
conflict in Nicaragua, Dickson analyzed the content of The New York Times and The 
Washington Post articles between 1983 and 1987. The purpose of her analysis was to find 
out the degree to which these papers relied on U.S. government officials rather than other 
sources for information about the conflict. Results of the content analysis indicated that 
both papers were heavily dependent on officials in Washington for information and an 
overwhelming majority of stories about the conflict were put together by the papers’ staff 
members in the United States, particularly in Washington, DC.  
Several explanations have been offered for the disproportionate reliance of the 
media on officialdom. According to Entman (1989), the media get most of their 
information from officials because the “least expensive way to satisfy mass audiences is 
to rely upon legitimate political elites for most information” due to the elites’ cultural 
legitimacy and the “facts” they supply. The extent to which the media are dependent on 
official sources can be gauged by the fact that the beat system in most media 
organizations is organized along the lines of government bureaucracy. The enormity and 
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complexity of day-to-day events necessitate the establishment and practice of certain 
routines in order to make it possible for media organizations to control the task of 
reporting the news (Shoemaker and Reese, 1991). Therefore, the established routines of 
newsgathering, as well as the ease of availability and the perceived prestige and 
objectivity of official sources, ensure the media’s dependence on them for information. 
Thus, as the results of Dickson’s analysis point out, the media to a great extent legitimate 
the prevailing government “line” (p. 569; emphasis in original). 
Apart from organizational routines, the principle of objectivity that journalists 
must observe while reporting on a multi-dimensional issue also ensures that certain 
voices will get aired more than others. Since the practice of objectivity means journalists 
have to interview legitimate elites on all major sides of a dispute, it is easy for those elites 
who can improve their access and package their viewpoint in media-friendly terms, to 
make sure that they gain favorable coverage (Entman, 1989; Noakes and Wilkins, 2002). 
Since the nature and identity of the sources used is important to understand the manner in 
which an event or issue has been covered, this study will look at the sources used by the 
U.S. media in the coverage of Kashmir to determine which voices and perspectives got 
aired. 
 
Justification for the Problem 
 It is important to understand how the U.S. media have covered the Kashmir 
conflict by studying the frames they have used in this coverage for three reasons. First, 
because in general the study of frames helps one to understand how the media construct 
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social reality, the study of these frames will help one understand how the U.S. media 
have described, explained and interpreted the Kashmir conflict. Second, since foreign 
news is the most obvious area where the media shape people’s perceptions of reality for 
the reason that a vast majority of people have limited resources for acquiring and 
interpreting information about events in foreign nations (Gamson, 1992), then this study 
could serve as a starting point for the study of the impact of the frames used in coverage 
of the conflict on the perception of the conflict itself and the parties engaged in it. Third, 
by analyzing the coverage of Kashmir for the presence of frames as well as tracking the 
changes in those frames over a 15-year period, this study will contribute to knowledge 
about foreign news coverage of the U.S. media, particularly about an area of the world 
that has until recently not been of much interest to U.S. policymakers and consequently 
the media.  
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Chapter Two 
Review of Literature 
  
In order to understand the frames that have been used in the coverage of the 
Kashmir conflict, one needs to acquaint oneself with the genesis and history of the 
conflict as well as the nature and significance of media frames. This section provides a 
brief account of the Kashmir issue in the context of relations between India and Pakistan 
and also their relations with the international community, particularly the United States. 
This chapter also discusses in some detail the concept of framing as a means of 
organizing media text as well as the impact of frames on consumers of the media.   
 
Overview of the Kashmir Dispute 
The British left the Indian subcontinent in August 1947, but not before 
supervising its division into two nations - India and Pakistan. The basis of partition was 
religious – while India was a seen as a Hindu-majority state, Pakistan was envisioned by 
its founder, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, to be the home of the subcontinent’s Muslims. 
Hindu-majority areas were designated parts of India while Muslim-majority areas were 
parts of the new Pakistan. All provinces ruled by kings and princes were given a choice 
of acceding into either nascent state. The region of Kashmir (or the current Indian state 
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called Jammu & Kashmir) was a Muslim-majority province ruled by a Hindu king who 
procrastinated on the decision to join either India or Pakistan (Ganguly, 2001; Dixit, 
2002). 
 In October 1947, a tribal group in the southwestern part of Kashmir rebelled 
against the king and was provided support by the Pakistani army in the form of men and 
materials. When the rebels moved to the outskirts of Srinagar, the capital of the region, 
the king panicked and approached India for assistance. The Indian Prime Minister, Pandit 
Jawaharlal Nehru, agreed to provide military assistance on the condition that the king 
accede to India and the accession be approved by a popular leader and the people’s 
representative, Sheikh Abdullah. 
 Once the above two conditions were met, the Indian Army was airlifted into 
Kashmir. The two sides fought a bitter battle till the declaration of a United Nations-
sponsored ceasefire on January 1, 1949. By the time the war ended, the rebels supported 
by the Pakistani Army had managed to capture a third of the territory of the former 
princely state. The ceasefire line was declared the Line of Control (LoC) between the two 
nations and it has remained as such till this day. India referred the matter in 1948 to the 
United Nations Security Council, which passed several resolutions asking Kashmiri 
rebels and Pakistani forces to withdraw and mandating a free and fair plebiscite to 
determine the fate of Kashmir. Due to deep-rooted mistrust of each other, India and 
Pakistan have never carried out the terms of the U.N. resolution. The area captured by the 
rebels in the 1947 war is called “Azad” (Free) Kashmir by Pakistan and “Pakistan-
occupied” Kashmir (PoK) by India. The area under Indian control is called the state of 
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Jammu & Kashmir by India and Indian-occupied Kashmir by Pakistan and Kashmiri 
separatists (Schofield, 2003).  
 The dispute about whether Kashmir should be a part of India or Pakistan is tied to 
the respective identities of the two nations. While on the one hand Pakistan contends that 
Kashmir should legitimately be a part of its territory because the two-nation theory holds 
that Muslim-majority regions be a part of Pakistan, India insists that it cannot allow any 
part of its territory to be separated from it on the basis of religious affiliation because 
India was founded to be a pluralistic and multi-religious nation (Dixit, 2002). Pakistan 
has consistently demanded that India conduct the UN-mandated plebiscite, a demand that 
India refuses to meet on the grounds that the plebiscite was on condition that Pakistan 
withdraw completely from the region, which it has not done to date. India also asserts 
that Kashmir is legitimately a part of its territory because the king chose to accede into 
India after the partition. Another important reason why India refuses to let go of Kashmir 
is because it fears this will set off a domino effect and provide support to other regions in 
India that want to break off from the Indian union (Cohen, 2003). 
In subsequent years, the Cold War between the then U.S.S.R. and the United 
States shaped India-Pakistan relations. While Pakistan courted western powers by 
advertising itself as a potential protector of Western interests in the oil-rich and 
predominantly Muslim Middle East, India positioned itself as a non-aligned nation and 
developed a close relationship with Russia (Ayoob, 1999). Pakistan was a major U.S. aid 
recipient through the cold war years and was given substantial arms assistance by the 
United States to help bring about the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan 
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(Tahir-Kheli, 1997). Along with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, Pakistan was a very important 
partner in the U.S. effort to support Afghan resistance fighters to mount a “jihad” (holy 
war) against the Soviet Union.  
Tensions between India and Pakistan continued to simmer and reached a head 
several times, resulting in three more wars after the 1947 war – one in 1965, when 
Pakistan attacked India, believing it to be weakened by a humiliating defeat in the hands 
of China in 1962; and another in 1971, when India was instrumental in helping what was 
then East Pakistan to break away from Pakistan and become a separate nation – 
Bangladesh (Ganguly, 2001). The third, albeit undeclared war was fought in 1999 in the 
Kargil sector in the upper reaches of the Himalyas in Kashmir. 
A decisive turn in the Kashmir dispute came in 1989, when Muslim extremists 
started an armed separatist movement in the Kashmir valley (Dixit, 2002; Cohen, 2003). 
Their objective was a Kashmir independent of both India and Pakistan. After the start of 
the movement for self-rule, Hindus, who were a minority in the Kashmir valley, left their 
homeland in hordes. As civilian massacres became an everyday occurrence, the state 
government was dissolved and the Indian Army moved into the state to control the 
situation. Throughout the 1990s, the Indian Army continued to battle militant groups in 
Kashmir. India routinely accused Pakistan of supporting various terrorist groups in 
Kashmir and repeatedly asked Pakistan to refrain from doing so. On the other hand, 
Pakistan persistently accused India of denying Kashmiris the right to self-determination 
and of committing human rights violations (Dixit, 2002). Matters were further 
complicated and took a turn toward Islamic fundamentalism and “jihad” when the 
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Afghanistan war ended in a Russian defeat in 1989 and Afghani mercenary fighters 
moved into Kashmir to support militant groups in the early 1990s. 
Another turning point in India-Pakistan relations and in Kashmir as the 
subcontinent’s flashpoint came when both countries tested their nuclear devices in May 
1998. Defying pressure from the western powers to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT), which stipulated a ban on nuclear testing, India tested five nuclear 
devices on May 11 and May 13, 1998 (McHorney, 2002). Alarmed at India’s actions, 
Pakistan also conducted underground nuclear tests on May 28 and 30. As a punitive 
measure, the U.S administration headed by President Bill Clinton imposed economic 
sanctions against India and Pakistan, limiting U.S. economic aid as well as trade and 
military transfers to both countries.  
The nuclearization of the subcontinent raised the profile of the Kashmir issue in 
the international arena, as western powers became increasingly alarmed at the possibility 
of border skirmishes escalating into a nuclear war between the two countries, 
notwithstanding India’s offer of no first use of nuclear weapons. Ironically, according to 
New Delhi and Islamabad, overt acquisition of nuclear weapons had significantly reduced 
the likelihood of war between them (Ganguly, 2001).   
The first post-nuclear-tests war between India and Pakistan was fought in and 
around Kargil in the upper reaches of the western Himalayas in the summer of 1999. 
Taking advantage of inadequate patrolling of this very harsh and inhospitable terrain, the 
Pakistani Army and Kashmiri insurgents had infiltrated across the LoC in the spring of 
1999, taking the Indian Army by surprise. India conducted air strikes against the 
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intruders, who had a strategic advantage over ground troops as they had firmly 
entrenched themselves in high-altitude positions. The Clinton administration, in marked 
contrast to its policy of mediating regional disputes, refused to support Pakistan’s attempt 
to bring the issue into the United Nations Security Council. This stance was also a 
departure from the traditionally pro-Pakistani U.S. policy, and finally forced Pakistani 
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to order a withdrawal from Kargil on July 4, 1999 
(Ganguly, 2001; Dixit, 2002). 
The decade of the nineties saw the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the 
United States as the world’s sole superpower. Indo-US relations improved, with 
increased bilateral trade and the emergence of India as a hub for information technology. 
Clinton’s refusal to mediate in the Kargil crisis and his subsequent visit to India in 2000 
marked a positive shift in relations between the United States and India. Taking 
cognizance of India’s assertion that Pakistan was sponsoring terrorism in Kashmir, 
Clinton, in a public broadcast in Pakistan during his 2000 visit, warned Pakistan of 
potential international isolation if the nation did not change its course.  
The events of September 11, 2001 and the U.S. war against terrorism changed all 
that and brought Pakistan back to center stage in the triangular relationship. While India 
courted the United States enthusiastically – a marked departure from its previous policy 
towards the country – the U.S. chose to partner with Pakistan in its attempt to uproot the 
Taliban from Afghanistan (Mohan, 2002). Pakistan’s location and the Pakistani Army’s 
intimate knowledge of the Taliban no doubt played a decisive role in the US decision to 
ask Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf for support. 
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Nevertheless, the terrorist attacks on the twin towers of the World Trade Center in 
New York City have made the U.S. administration more sympathetic to India’s terrorist 
concerns. The administration’s new pro-India attitude was reflected in its response to the 
spate of terrorist attacks in India after September 11, notably the attack on the Indian 
Parliament on December 13, 2001. In response to this attack, India mounted a massive 
military deployment, cut off transportation links with Pakistan, downgraded diplomatic 
ties with Pakistan, and threatened to go to war against Pakistan (Schaffer, 2002). The 
George Bush administration quickly intervened and for the first time formally 
acknowledged the link between Kashmiri terrorist groups and the Pakistani state. This act 
pressured Pakistani president General Pervez Musharraf to declare that Pakistani soil 
would not be used to export terror to any part of the world and resulted in formal 
commitments from Pakistan to end cross-border infiltration into India. He kept his 
promise and in January 2002 banned the Lashkar-e-toiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammad, 
two Islamic jihadi outfits that had been involved in the attack on the Indian Parliament 
(www.rediff.com). 
At present, there is a debate in academic circles as to whether the United States 
should help India and Pakistan work out a permanent solution to the dispute over 
Kashmir, going beyond its traditional role of episodic crisis management. Some argue 
that the moment is opportune, with India-U.S. relations improving considerably (Mohan, 
2002) and the growing realization in the United States that in order to check global 
terrorism, failing states such as Pakistan need to be addressed on a long-term basis 
(Schaffer 2002). Others, however, argue that U.S. mediation in Kashmir is a distant 
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possibility because the region is of little interest to the United States for several reasons 
(Limaye, 2002, p164). The dispute is largely unfamiliar to most Americans and Kashmir 
contains no resources that are of interest to the U.S. and its allies. Also, resolution of the 
conflict does not involve any ideological values dear to the United States. Although 
preventing nuclear war has been the centerpiece of U.S. policy towards South Asia in the 
past decade, the region still remains a low-priority area for U.S. diplomats. 
 
Framing 
A major and fairly recent part of media effects research, framing theory is used to 
explain the power of a communicating text. Framing by the mass media is an essential 
part of their role in the construction of social reality (Tuchman, 1978). The news media 
have the power to shape the meanings that the audience assigns to an issue or event 
because they “disseminate the information that people want, need, and should know” (p. 
2). In this way, the media actively promote the frames of reference that readers and 
viewers use to interpret and discuss public events and problems. McCombs, Shaw and 
Weaver (1997) have equated framing with second-level agenda setting, which is transfer 
of issue attributes from the media to the public. They argue that framing is an extension 
of agenda setting in terms of media effects. The mass media have been shown to have on 
the public, a powerful agenda setting influence whereby the priority assigned by the 
media to certain issues gets translated into the priority assigned to them by the consumers 
of these mass media (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). While agenda setting describes the 
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power of the media to tell people “what” to think about, framing can be regarded as 
telling them “how” to think about it. 
Framing can be defined as the selection of some attributes of a given event or 
issue and the presentation of them as more prominent than other attributes or aspects of 
the event or issue in the media. According to Entman (1993), “to frame is to select some 
aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in 
such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral 
evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (p. 52; emphasis in original). According 
to Gitlin (1980), the origin of frames lies in the media’s selection of certain versions of 
reality over others. “Day by day, normal organizational procedures define “the story,” 
identify the protagonists and the issues, and suggest appropriate attitudes toward them” 
(p. 4; emphases in original). Since this research is limited to the print media, it will 
discuss only frames that are embedded in print news texts. 
Frames have four locations – the communicator, the text, the audience and the 
culture – and on any given issue, frames from different locations might be different from 
each other (Entman, 1993). The communicators (journalists) have certain ways in which 
they cover each event and these are dictated by news values, routines of news coverage – 
deadline pressures, preferred use of certain types of sources over others, and 
organizational ideology – and their own personal values (Shoemaker & Reese, 1991; 
Tuchman, 1978). These factors contribute to them looking at events in a certain manner; 
this gets translated intentionally or otherwise into frames in the text that they write 
(Gamson, 1989). 
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 The presence of frames in a text can be gauged by looking for the use of “certain 
keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, and sentences that 
provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments” (p. 52; Entman, 1993). 
These frames are transferred to the readers, who interpret them according to their mental 
schemata, defined as mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide individuals’ processing 
of information (Graber, 1988). In the words of Lippman (1922), “the only feeling that 
anyone can have about an event that he does not experience is the feeling aroused by his 
mental image of that event” (p.13). Although each member of the audience has unique 
mental schemata, frames can be regarded as having a common effect on the majority, if 
not all, of the people subjected to them. This common effect on readers is what makes it 
important to study the frames used by the mass media. 
The fourth location for frames is the culture, which can be regarded as a 
storehouse of values, beliefs and practices that inform both the communicator and the 
audience. The frames embedded in popular culture assume special significance in 
international communication because journalists reporting on a foreign nation are bound 
to frame their messages in a manner that is compatible with the audience and cultural 
frames in their home country. According to Graber (1980), American correspondents 
abroad must operate within the context of current American politics and the current 
American culture and their stories “must not only reflect the American value structure, 
but also conform to established American stereotypes.” For example, Noakes and 
Wilkins (2002) contend that US media coverage of the first Palestinian intifada (popular 
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uprising against Israel in 1987), was sympathetic to the Palestinians’ cause because the 
claims of the intifada resonated with Western social movement frames. 
Entman (1993) has said that the frame in a text is an imprint of power. Several 
powerful groups compete to get their frames included in the reporting of an event or issue 
and therefore a communicating text conveys the frame of the group that won the battle to 
dominate it. According to Lippman (1922), since major issues are very complicated and 
subject to several different choices and opinions, “it is natural that everyone should wish 
to make his or her own choice of facts for the newspapers to print” (p. 345).  An obvious 
example of this tussle for ensuring that one’s interpretation of an issue is the dominant 
perception about it, is the one that goes on between interest groups on either side of a 
debate.  
Andsager (2000) studied the comparative success of pro-life and pro-choice 
groups in dominating media discourse on policymaking on late-term abortion in 1996 
through their use of rhetoric. She found that although pro-choice groups had more press 
releases than pro-life ones, the rhetorical terms used by pro-life groups appeared in the 
media twice as frequently as those used by pro-choice groups. Andsager posited that this 
could be because the pro-life rhetoric “fit-in with journalists’ attitude towards late-term 
abortion, which most people found grisly, as well as the traditional newsworthiness value 
of conflict” (Andsager, 200; p. 589). It is apparent from her study that the rhetoric 
employed by competing groups has an impact on journalistic framing. 
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Framing Effects 
 The salience of a frame in a media text is a product of the interaction of the 
frames embedded in the text and in the mental schemas of the reader. Although the 
presence of frames in a text, as detected by researchers, does not guarantee that audience 
frames will be identical to the frames in the text (Entman, 1989), media frames, by 
emphasizing some aspects of a problem over others, activate certain kinds of knowledge 
within people, and this in turn affects their trains of thought and recommended behavior. 
According to Price, Tewksbury and Powers (1997), media frames have two kinds of 
effects on the audience – applicability effects and accessibility effects. During processing 
of a media text, the salient attributes of the text activate in readers’ minds certain ideas 
that affect their response to the message. These are called applicability effects. Once 
activated, these ideas and feelings remain in the readers’ minds and are used in making 
subsequent evaluations. These are defined as accessibility effects. 
Price et al (1997) conducted an experiment in which undergraduate students were 
asked to read articles about possible cuts in state funding. They manipulated an article to 
reflect three different dominant frames – a conflict frame, a human interest frame, and a 
consequence frame. They also used a fourth group as control, subjecting its members to a 
story that just had the bare bones of the proposed budget cut. In the posttest 
questionnaire, respondents were asked to write down all thoughts and feelings they had 
while reading the stories randomly assigned to them. Coding of the open-ended answers 
revealed a significant difference in the responses of the groups subjected to different 
frames.  
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To study the long-term effects of message framing on readers’ cognitive 
responses, Tewksbury, Jones, Peske, Raymond and Vig (2000) conducted a two-wave 
experiment where they asked undergraduate students in the University of Illinois, 
Urbana-Champaign, to read five experimentally manipulated versions of a news article 
on proposed state regulation of large-scale hog farms. One of the articles was an 
objective version of the issues surrounding hog farms with equal emphasis on the 
environmental impact of unregulated hog farms and the economic impact of regulating 
them. Two articles moderately emphasized the environmental and economic frames 
respectively while the last two were extremely lopsided in each direction. The 
respondents were asked to fill out a posttest questionnaire with specific questions gauging 
their “feelings towards large-scale hog farms” and whether they thought large-scale hog 
farms should be banned in the state of Illinois. They were also asked to summarize the 
large-scale hog farm issue. Three weeks later, the subjects completed an identical test. 
The results confirmed that subjects’ cognitions were affected by the relative 
dominance of frames within the articles that they read. For example, the subjects in the 
environmental frame were more likely to support regulation of large-scale hog farms. The 
strength of the pattern was lower three weeks later but still present, reflecting the 
persistence of frames. As the results of this experiment indicate, the different frames that 
journalists use to report on an issue can significantly impact public thinking on that issue. 
However, Tewksbury et al (2000) caution that such prominent effects may only be in 
case of issues that are not very mainstream. Iyengar (1991) found that the relationship 
between media frames and audience frames is strongly contingent upon the issue under 
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study. For instance experimental manipulation of a highly salient issue like 
unemployment did not have a significant impact on the respondents’ attribution of 
responsibility for a problem. Since foreign news constitutes a very meager amount of 
coverage in the U.S. media and the American public is highly ethnocentric (Graber, 1980, 
it follows that the dispute over Kashmir is not a very salient issue for them and therefore 
media frames would have a major impact on what they think about the issue. From the 
above discussion, one can conclude that media frames do have an impact on audience 
thinking about issues, particularly regarding non-salient ones.  
 
Research Questions 
 In light of the literature cited above, it can be argued that it is important to 
understand the frames that the U.S. media have used in the past and are using now in 
their coverage of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan because those media 
frames are the source of the mental frames about the issue for American people as well as 
for American policymakers, albeit to a lesser extent. Drawing from Entman’s (1993) 
perspective on frames, one can say that analyzing the media coverage for frames would 
also yield information about the problem definitions, causal interpretations, moral 
evaluations, and treatment recommendations that the U.S. media have been promoting for 
the Kashmir crisis. 
Gamson (1989) conceptualized that media discourse on any issue can be 
conceived as a set of interpretive packages, with the frame as the central organizing idea 
forming the core of each interpretive package. Frames are the tools that help the audience 
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and even journalists in constructing meaning and making sense of relevant events, by 
suggesting what is at issue. However, packages are not static. Media discourse on any 
particular issue evolves as these packages change over time incorporating new events into 
their interpretive frames. 
In the 15-year time period chosen for this study, many changes occurred in the 
nature of the dispute over Kashmir, in India-Pakistan relations, in the two countries’ 
relationships with the United States, as well as in the global climate. At the beginning of 
the time period under analysis – 1989 – the Cold War was ending between the United 
States and the erstwhile Soviet Union, the Afghanistan war between the occupying Soviet 
troops and U.S.- and Pakistan-supported Afghan resistance fighters or “mujahideen” 
ended in 1989 with the withdrawal of Soviet troops, and an armed separatist movement 
started in Kashmir. While the movement for self-rule in Kashmir evolved with Kashmiri 
rebels seeing the advent of Afghani mujahideen in their ranks through the nineties, on the 
global front, the Cold War came to an end and the focus of international relations shifted 
towards nuclear containment. In 1998, both India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons 
establishing their identity as nuclear-capable states and in the opinion of the world 
Kashmir became a flashpoint that could trigger a nuclear war. In 1999, the two countries 
fought the Kargil War, which ended in a ceasefire brought about by the Clinton 
administration. The late 1990s also saw improved relations between India and the United 
States.  
The next major event that shook the world was the terrorist attack on the twin 
towers in New York City on September 11, 2001, which fueled the Afghanistan war and 
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ended in the rout of the Pakistan-supported Taliban. On December 13, 2001, an armed 
jihadi group staged a suicide attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi killing 14 
people, including the five attackers. In the summer of 2002, India and Pakistan mobilized 
their troops along their border in Kashmir resulting in a massive standoff. The year 2003 
saw a cooling down of tensions between India and Pakistan. This study attempts to track 
the changes in U.S. media discourse on the Kashmir dispute in order to investigate 
whether these events had an impact on the frames employed in its coverage. Therefore, 
the first research question for the study is:  
Have the frames in the U.S. print media coverage of the Kashmir 
conflict changed in the 15-year period from January 1, 1989 to 
December 31, 2003 and to what extent have these changes reflected 
major developments in the region, in relations between India and 
Pakistan, and in international affairs? 
Since U.S. interest, threat to U.S. security and threat to world peace have been 
found to be significant predictors of foreign news coverage by the U.S. media (Chang, 
Shoemaker, and Brendlinger, 1987; Chang and Lee, 1992), an analysis of the frames in 
the coverage on Kashmir would also show whether these concerns are also reflected on 
how the issue is presented in the U.S. media. Exploring the frames in the coverage on 
Kashmir would reveal whether the contextual statements made reflect the U.S. 
government’s position on the issue as well as the country’s changing relationship with 
India and Pakistan.  
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Drawing from the above discussion, the second research question is: 
What have been the dominant frames in the U.S. print media 
coverage of the Kashmir conflict, and to what extent have these 
frames reflected such major themes as religion, armed conflict, U.S. 
national interest, threat to world peace, and so on.  
The above literature review established the importance of sources – especially 
official – in the reporting of events and issues. It was also suggested that media frames 
carry the imprint of power because they are the outcome of the battle among sources 
from different sides of a dispute to get their respective version of reality to be the one that 
is most accepted. Frames are tools that help in the construction of reality and organize the 
world into manageable chunks for the mass media audience (Tuchman, 1974; Gamson, 
1989). Since making sense of the world requires effort, it follows that tools that are 
prominently displayed and made cognitively readily accessible have a higher probability 
of being used. Consequently, the sources that have the most access to the media because 
they mold themselves to media requirements are more likely to ensure that their 
interpretation becomes the dominant one.  
This study will look at the sources used in the media text on the Kashmir conflict 
to determine their origin and nature because these characteristics are important indicators 
of the meanings that the media have chosen to attach to the issue. Last but not least, 
knowledge of the sources used from both sides of the conflict and the relative emphasis 
placed on them by the US media will inform the public relations and lobbying efforts of 
the two countries. 
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Therefore, the third research question is: 
What are the nature and affiliation of the sources used by the U.S. 
print media in the coverage of the Kashmir conflict? 
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Chapter Three 
Methodology 
 
 Frames are difficult to detect in news texts because many of the framing devices 
used might appear as “natural” (Entman, 1991, p. 6; emphasis in original), unremarkable 
choices of words and images. It is this nature of frames – to be present in a very 
inconspicuous or “natural” fashion in the text – that makes them instrumental in 
establishing a particular version of reality as the “common sense” (p. 6; emphasis in 
original) or widespread interpretation of events. Both Entman (1991) and Gamson and 
Modigliani (1989) contend that frames can be constructed from and are manifested in the 
form of metaphors, keywords, concepts, symbols, visual images, exemplars, catchphrases 
and depictions. In order to detect the frames used to describe the Kashmir conflict and the 
actors involved, one therefore needs to identify these framing devices. Stripped down to 
their grammatical basics, these devices are merely nouns and verbs, and their modifiers – 
adjectives and adverbs. This method of analyzing parts of speech to detect frames used in 
this research study is derived from the works of Entman (1989), Dyer, Miller and Boone 
(1991) and Mills (1993).  
Entman (1989) compared the U.S. media coverage given to the shooting of a 
Korean Air Lines flight by Soviet fighter planes on September 1, 1983 that killed 269 
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passengers and crew with the coverage given to the shooting of an Iran Air plane on July 
3, 1988 that killed 290 people on board. In order to identify the frames, he looked for 
specific words – nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs chosen to describe the victims, the 
incident, and the act of shooting down of the planes. For example, some of the words that 
described the victims were “innocent human beings,” “loved ones,” and “passengers;” 
some words for the incident per se were “atrocity,” “murder,” and “massacre;” and some 
words used to describe the shooting act were “barbaric/barbarous,” “deliberate(ly),” and 
“murderous” (p. 19, p. 20). Similarly, in their analysis of the content of two wire services 
one year before and one year after the Exxon Valdez crisis in March 1988, Dyer et al 
(1991) identified three kinds of issues pertaining to the event – legal, economic and 
environmental. They selected terms – words or groups of words – that characterized each 
issue “based on the extent to which it was felt those terms occurred in the data context 
and represented the occurrence of the issue.” Some of the terms that categorized the issue 
as legal were “litigation,” “trial,” and “arbitration;” some that fit under the economic 
category were “profit,” “merger,” and “stock;” and finally, the environmental issue 
category included terms like “wildlife,” “dispersants,” and “otter” (p. 31). 
Mills (1993) looked at the frames employed in the coverage of the armed conflict 
between U.S. agents and the members of the Branch Davidian cult led by David Koresh 
in Waco, Texas in the spring of 1993 by The Washington Post and the St Petersburg 
Times. He analyzed 213 stories from these two newspapers for keywords, phrases, or 
literary devices “with particular attention being paid to nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs 
and descriptive figures of speech in the texts and headlines” (p. 26). Mills identified 
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“narrative elements in the text that were instrumental in adding (or subtracting) meaning 
within the coverage. For example, any nouns used to identify or adjectives used to 
describe cult members were coded, provided those nouns and adjectives added a sense of 
meaning to the text.” (p. 26) Mills grouped words such as “standoff,” “fortified,” and 
“violent” into a “Warfare” frame; words like “messiah,” “abusive,” and “apocalyptic” 
into a “Religious fanaticism” frame; and words such as “disaster,” “death toll,” and 
“tragedy” into a “Tragic victims” frame (p. 30). This study will follow the examples of 
Entman, Dyer et al and Mills in its coding of the text of news reports on Kashmir from 
January 1, 1989 to December 31, 2003 in The New York Times, The Los Angeles Times 
and The Washington Post.  
These three newspapers were chosen as the media to be examined because they 
are “prestige” newspapers that enjoy widespread respect not only among the reading 
public but also among elites, including policymakers (Graber, 1980). The New York 
Times offers a comprehensive coverage of the Kashmir dispute during the time period 
under study – 1989 to 2003. A Lexis Nexis headline search for “Kashmir” from January 
1, 1989 to December 31, 2003 yielded a total of 188 articles from The New York Times 
and 53 from The Washington Post while a similar search in the database, ABI Inform 
Global, yielded 57 articles for the specified period in the Los Angeles Times. Since the 
aim of this study is to examine the frames employed in the news coverage given to the 
Kashmir conflict specifically by these newspapers, editorials, letters to the editor, and 
wire reports were eliminated from the population. The articles were grouped under four 
time periods because the distribution of stories in the 15-year-period under study was 
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unequal, with some years having an overwhelmingly large number of stories and some 
having none, particularly in the Los Angeles Times and The Washington Post.  
The first time period included stories from The New York Times and The 
Washington Post in the years 1989 and 1990. There were no articles on Kashmir in the 
Los Angeles Times for these two years. The second period of study was 1991 to 1998, and 
included 31 stories from The New York Times and three each from The Washington Post 
and the Los Angeles Times. The third period was from 1999 to 2001, with a significant 
jump in the number of stories from 1998 to 1999 in the Los Angeles Times (3 to 19) and 
The New York Times (4 to 24). The fourth period was the two-year period from 2002 to 
2003, because there was a second increase in coverage from 2001 to 2002 in all the three 
newspapers under study: from 15 to 51 in The New York Times, 5 to 24 in the Los 
Angeles Times and from 6 to 21 in The Washington Post.  
In order to maintain a certain degree of parity with the years where there was no 
coverage, a random sample was chosen from the years where the number of stories was 
more than 10 in any of the newspapers. So since the number of articles in The New York 
Times and The Washington Post were more than 10 in 1990, 33 and 13 respectively, a 
random sample of 17 and 6 stories were chosen from the two newspapers respectively. 
Table 1 shows the composition of the sample of news stories that were analyzed for this 
study. In order to answer the first and second research questions which are how have the 
frames in the coverage of the Kashmir dispute changed in the time period under study 
and what have been the dominant frames, the selected articles were analyzed for the 
frames used to describe the conflict, the region, and the three parties to it – Indians, 
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Pakistanis and Kashmiris. These articles were also analyzed to determine the sources 
used in the coverage of the dispute. The unit of analysis was each word of interest in each 
of the 180 articles. 
Table 1: Distribution of Stories (1989-2003) in the Sample  
 
Time period Newspapers No. of stories 
The New York Times 23 
1989-1990 
The Washington Post 7
Subtotal  30
The New York Times 33
The Washington Post 3
1991-1998 
Los Angeles Times 3
  Subtotal  39
The New York Times 25
The Washington Post 6
 
1999-2001 
Los Angeles Times 17
Subtotal  48
The New York Times 33
The Washington Post 13
2001-2003 
Los Angeles Times 17
Subtotal  63
Total  180
 
The articles were coded for keywords, metaphors, descriptors and other such 
framing devices by picking out the nouns and verbs and their modifiers – adjectives and 
adverbs – that have been used to describe each of the following “subjects” – Kashmir as a 
conflict per se; Kashmir and South Asia as a geographic region; Indians and India; 
Pakistanis and Pakistan; Kashmiris and Kashmir; the United States; and “Other” parties.  
Once these terms were identified, the author grouped them into thematic clusters or 
frames in a manner similar to that of Entman (1989), Dyer et al (1991) and Mills (1993). 
After identifying the frames on the basis of the keywords found and coded in the 180 
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articles under study, the author made a list of the frames evident in each of the time 
periods for each subject and then compared the frames evident in all four time phases for 
all subjects for any patterns that emerge over the entire 15-year period studied. The 
author assessed whether changes in the frames may be related to and explained by 
placing them in the context of developments in the region and in the world at that time. 
In order to answer the third research question, namely, what is the nature and 
origin of the sources used by the U.S. media in the coverage of Kashmir, the articles were 
coded for the sources used on the basis of two criteria: the first was their affiliation that is 
whether they were Pakistani, Indian, Kashmiri, U.S or other; the second criterion was 
their nature – official or unofficial. Sources from both Pakistan-occupied and Indian-
occupied Kashmir were categorized as being Kashmiri. Government, military, political 
and diplomatic sources were categorized as official, whereas representatives of militant 
organizations, religious organizations, human rights organizations, academic and 
professional research groups, laypersons and so on were categorized as unofficial 
sources. Once the sources were coded on the basis of their nature and affiliation, the 
author performed a frequency analysis on them to see the percentage of official versus 
unofficial sources used as well as the percentages of Indian, Pakistani, Kashmiri and U.S. 
and other sources used in the 15-year time period. 
In order to establish the reliability of the coding decisions, a random sample of 
articles was chosen and coded by the author and two other coders who were both 
University of South Florida graduate students, one in the Mass Communications track 
and the other in the Journalism track. Both coders were in their fifth semester of study at 
 USF and had knowledge of mass media theories and practices. For the purpose of 
establishing the reliability, the author and the two coders coded the first article appearing 
in all three newspapers in seven randomly chosen years from the 15-year period under 
study. The total number of articles coded was 13 – seven from The New York Times and 
three each from The Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times. There were no articles 
in The Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times for four of the randomly chosen 
years. The author conducted a brief training session with the two other coders to explain 
to them the conceptual and operational definitions of each of the categories mentioned 
earlier. The intercoder reliability between each of the two coders and the author was 
computed with the help of Holsti’s (1969) formula, which is: 
Reliability =     2M 
   
   N1+N2
 
where M is the number of coding decisions on which the two coders agree and N1 
and N2 are the total number of coding decisions taken by the two coders. 
After establishing the intercoder reliability, the author proceeded to code all the 
180 articles with the help of a coding sheet (see Appendix A), categorizing the words in 
the news reports for each period according to their part of speech and “subject” they 
described. The author also coded the sources according to the “subject” they represented 
and also based on their nature – official or unofficial. 
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Chapter Four 
Results 
 
Since the findings of this research study were very extensive, a detailed report of 
the findings has been provided in this chapter while the specific conclusions that answer 
the research questions as well as explanations, interpretations and implications of these 
conclusions are included in the final chapter of this document.  
Mass media frames are elements – words and groups of words – that are used by 
journalists to describe, explain and interpret “subjects” for their audiences, which are 
dependent on the media for information, especially about occurrences in foreign 
countries. The “subjects” may be events, occurrences and issues, players involved in the 
event, the thoughts, feelings and attitudes of the players, as well as the situations and 
contexts of their occurrences. To delineate frames in the coverage of an event or issue, 
one has to look at the words – keywords and modifiers – that describe the “subjects.” In 
order to then identify the frames in the coverage of a particular “subject,” one needs to 
identify the regularities in the keywords and modifiers used for it. One can then place the 
keywords and/or modifiers that are similar in meaning in thematic groups or thematic 
clusters or frames and develop names or labels for these frames. The process is somewhat 
similar to the development of “factors” in the quantitative analysis of news coverage and 
has been followed in the past by Entman (1989) in his analysis of the U.S. media 
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coverage of the KAL and Iran Air accidents, Dyer et al (1991) in their analysis of the 
wire service coverage of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, and Mills (1993) in his analysis of 
the shifting framework of the news coverage of the cult crisis in Waco, Texas. 
In order to determine the changing frames used by the U.S. media in their 
coverage of the Kashmir conflict and thus to answer the first research question, the author 
followed a process similar to the one described above. First of all words – nouns, verbs, 
adjectives and adverbs – used to refer to the 1) conflict, 2) the Kashmir region, 3) India 
and Indians, 4) Pakistan and Pakistanis, 5) Kashmiris, 6) the United States and 7) other 
players or actors, were drawn out from the news articles appearing in The New York 
Times, The Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times in the 15-year period from 1989 
to 2003. In order to determine whether the frames used in the coverage of these 
“subjects” have changed over the past decade and a half, the coverage of the period was 
divided into four phases: 1989-1990, 1991-1998, 1999-2001 and 2002-2003 on the basis 
of the frequency of news articles appearing in these years. The number of articles in The 
New York Times and The Washington Post dropped sharply from 1990 to 1991, but there 
was a leap in coverage from 1998 to 1999. One again, the number of articles in each of 
the three newspapers in 2002 and 2003 was significantly higher than in 2001.  
After the isolation and coding of words, a count was done to determine the 
frequency with which these words appeared in each phase of coverage. For each of the 
seven subjects identified above, words that appeared with the highest frequency were 
identified and grouped and expressions coined to capture the themes or frames among 
words that seemed to form thematic groups. Depending on their relative prominence, 
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frames were categorized as major and minor. The relative occurrence of these major and 
minor frames in each period was then assessed and compared in order to answer the first 
research question, which is whether the frames have changed in the 15 years of coverage 
from 1989 to 2003. This established the basis for answering the second research question 
which was of a more general nature and asked what have been the dominant frames in the 
coverage of the Kashmir conflict. To answer the third research question, about the nature 
– official or unofficial – and the affiliation – Indian, Pakistani, Kashmiri, U.S. and other – 
the sources used in each story were coded according to these criteria. To determine the 
relative frequency with which they were used, the number of times each source was used 
within each story was also recorded. 
However, prior to coding the 180 articles in the sample according to the 
previously described method and to establish the credibility of the results generated from 
the process, intercoder reliability was computed between the author and each of two other 
coders for 13 randomly chosen articles from the three newspapers under study. The 
results, which were computed with the help of Holsti’s formula (the acceptable level was 
set at 0.80 by the author), are summarized in the table below. 
Table 2: Intercoder Reliability Coefficients between Author and Two Coders 
 
Author and For sources For keywords 
Coder 1   0.97 0.86 
Coder 2  0.90 0.91 
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Frames for the conflict 
 Nouns that were synonymous with the events occurring in Kashmir from 1989 to 
2003 – armed struggle for separation from India, suppression of the rebellion by India, 
training and arming of Kashmiri militants by Pakistan, infiltration of foreign fighters 
especially those from Afghanistan – were identified, and then grouped into thematic 
clusters within each of the four previously identified phases. Adjectives that described 
these events were also coded and then grouped in the same fashion. Table 3 provides a 
summary of the major and minor frames in decreasing order of prominence as determined 
by the frequency of usage of their constituent words vis-à-vis both nouns and modifiers 
that were used to describe the conflict in the four periods of U.S. media coverage under 
study. 
 
1989-1990 
 In the first phase, in The Washington Post and The New York Times, there were a 
total of 30 articles on the Kashmir conflict, with 44 words used 197 times to describe the 
conflict per se. Of these words, the most commonly used descriptors for the conflict were 
“war” (quoted 40 times), “movement” (19) and “violence” (18). Due to its dominance 
over other words, “war” was defined as a frame in itself called “Warfare.” While 
“movement” was classified as part of a Mass-based Action frame, the word “violence” 
was cast into a Physical Violence frame. Both the latter two frames were minor frames 
for this period. Since all the other words used to describe the events in Kashmir in the 
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years 1989 and 1990 occurred far fewer times than the above three, those words were not 
taken into account.  
 The most commonly occurring modifier for the Kashmir conflict was “separatist” 
(12) followed by “independence” (7), “political” (5) and finally “anti-Indian” (4), all of 
them describing the nature of the events in Kashmir as being motivated by the desire of 
the Kashmiri people to break away from India. These modifiers form part of the Mass-
based Action frame that includes words like “movement” and “struggle” because they 
indicate the motive for the campaign being conducted by the Kashmiri people. 
In the first phase, the most commonly occurring verbs used for the conflict 
convey the impression of an event that is expanding in scale. Words such as “escalated,” 
“growing,” “worsened,” “has spread” and their synonyms appeared 10 times representing 
a Growing Unrest frame. 
 
1991-1998 
 In the second phase, 48 words were used 238 times to describe the conflict in a 
total of 39 articles from The New York Times, The Washington Post and the Los Angeles 
Times. The most prominent frame was once again Warfare with the word “war” 
occurring 51 times, followed by “insurgency” (29), “conflict” (26), “violence” (16), 
“rebellion” (14), and “dispute” (9). “Insurgency” and “rebellion” were grouped together 
to form the Internal Revolt frame. In this eight-year period of coverage, only two major 
frames emerge – the Warfare frame and the Internal Revolt frame. 
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 Although the modifiers signifying the Mass-based Action frame add up to a 
higher figure (18), the most prominent single modifier in this phase is “guerrilla” (15), 
which is a part of the Internal Revolt frame because while insurgency or rebellion is a 
name for the action that is being done, guerrilla signifies the method by which it is 
perpetrated. The modifier “nuclear” appears only 9 times in this period and can be 
considered a minor frame named Nuclear Risk. 
The frame for the conflict continued to be that of Growing Unrest, with words 
such as “degenerated,” “has threatened,” and “erupted,” that appeared a total of 11 times. 
Table 3: Frames for the Kashmir Conflict 
 
1989-1990 
 Major Frames Related Words Minor Frames Related Words 
1. Mass-based 
Action 
movement Noun 1. Warfare War 
2. Physical 
violence 
violence 
Modifiers 1. Mass-based 
Action 
separatist 
independence 
political 
anti-Indian 
 
Verbs  1. Growing Unrest escalated 
worsened 
growing 
 
1991-1998 
 Major Frames Related Words Minor Frames Related Words 
1. Warfare War 1. Conflict conflict Noun 
2. Internal Revolt insurgency 
rebellion 
2. Physical 
Violence 
violence 
Modifiers 3. Mass-based 
Action 
 
independence 
separatist 
secessionist 
independence 
1. Nuclear Risk nuclear 
Verbs Growing Unrest degenerated 
erupted 
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Table 3: Frames for the Kashmir Conflict (continued)
1999-2001 
 Major Frames Related Words Minor Frames Related Words 
1. Physical 
Violence 
fighting 
violence 
battle 
1. Terrorism terrorism 
2. Warfare War 
Noun 
3. Conflict conflict 
1. Internal Revolt insurgency 
1. Nuclear Risk nuclear 
2. Mass-based 
Action 
freedom 
independence 
3. Outside 
Interference 
Pakistan-backed 
Pakistan-based 
Modifiers 1. Long and 
Dangerous Conflict 
decade-old 
large-scale 
long-running 
dangerous 
protracted 
4.  Religious 
Identity 
Islamic 
Muslim 
Verbs Growing Unrest has raged 
could escalate 
 
2002-2003 
 Major Frames Related Words Minor Frames Related Words 
1. Warfare war 
2. Outside 
Interference 
infiltration 
incursion 
3. Physical 
Violence 
violence 
fighting 
killings 
Jihad 
battle 
4. Conflict conflict 
tensions 
standoff 
Noun 
5. Disagreement crisis 
dispute 
issue 
1. Mass-based 
Action 
struggle 
movement 
campaign 
1. Long and 
Dangerous Conflict 
large-scale 
widespread 
1. Nuclear Risk nuclear 
2. Mass-based 
Action 
separatist 
Modifiers 
2. Outside 
Interference 
cross-border 
3. Internal revolt guerrilla 
Verbs Growing Unrest continued 
intensified 
Stabilizing Unrest has calmed 
calming 
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1999-2001 
In the third phase of the period under study, there were 48 articles from all the 
three newspapers under study. The most commonly occurring word for the events in 
Kashmir was again “war” (75 times) signifying a Warfare frame, which was very closely 
rivaled by “conflict” (70) forming a frame called “Conflict,” and “fighting” (67) which 
was grouped with “violence” (26) to form a frame called “Physical Violence” because 
both words signify physical acts of violence with no necessary ideological dimension. 
The Physical Violence frame was discovered to be the dominant frame for this period, 
even overtaking the Warfare frame  
The modifiers describing the intensity and possible extent of the Kashmir conflict 
– labeled the Long and Dangerous Conflict frame – occurred a total of 43 times with 
words such as “decade-old,” “large-scale,” “long-running,” “dangerous,” “protracted” 
and “wider.” This frame had a greater prominence than other frames such as Nuclear 
Risk comprising the word “nuclear” (16), Mass-based Action made up of words like 
“freedom” and “independence” (13), and Religious Identity signified by use of modifiers 
such as “Islamic/Muslim” (10). The other frame that emerged through the modifiers for 
this phase were what was referred to as the Outside Interference frame (10) that 
included adjectives such as “Pakistan-backed” and “cross-border,” indicating 
involvement of parties other than Indians and the Kashmiris in the conflict. 
Continuing the trend observed in the first two phases, Growing Unrest 
comprising words such as “could escalate,” “has raged,” and “could deepen,” with a total 
of 15 uses, persists as the dominant frame in the third period as well. 
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2002-2003 
 In the fourth period, although once again “war” (108 occurrences) emerged as the 
most commonly occurring descriptor of the Kashmir conflict, two new words to dominate 
coverage were “infiltration” and “incursion.” These two words were considered part of 
the Outside Interference frame (99) that occurred for the first time in the previous 
phase. These words convey the perception that the conflict playing out in Kashmir was 
being actively supported and/or conducted by people outside the region. A close third 
was the Physical Violence frame with “violence” occurring 41 times, “fighting” 
occurring 18 times, “killings,” 14 times, “jihad,” 12 times and “battle,” 8 times.  
The fourth prominent frame was the Conflict frame, formed from the words 
“conflict” (30), “tensions” (29) and “standoff’ (13), which together occurred 72 times in 
the last two years of the time period under study. All these three words signify a 
protracted tussle over something between two or more parties that are unwilling to 
change their positions on the issue. A third frame was constructed by grouping together 
words such as “dispute” (30), “issue” (20) and “crisis” (11), which implied that there was 
a disagreement that had become a cause of contention between two or more parties 
which, in this case, are India, Pakistan and the local Kashmiris. This frame was labeled as 
the Disagreement frame. 
The Disagreement frame (51), formed by words such as “crisis” (27), “dispute” 
(17) and “issue” (7), was the fifth dominant frame in 2002-2003. “Struggle,” (17), 
“movement” (9), and “campaign” (7) constituted a minor frame called the Mass-based 
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Action because all these three words signify a broad-based activity aimed at changing the 
status quo. 
The most commonly occurring frame for modifiers was once again that of a Long 
and Dangerous Conflict (35) – comprising words like “all-out,” “escalating,” and “full-
blown” – followed by the Outside Interference frame constituted by the adjective 
“cross-border” (17). The Nuclear Risk frame, the Mass-based Action frame exemplified 
by the word “separatist,” and the Internal Revolt frame represented by the word 
“guerrilla,” were the minor frames for this period. 
 There were two types of descriptions for the intensity and direction of the conflict 
in this phase with Growing Unrest (20) still as the most prominent frame composed of 
words like “continued,” “intensified,” and “has escalated.” However, verbs such as 
“calming,” or “has calmed,” or “scaling back,” which were grouped into the Stabilizing 
Unrest frame (15), also appear in this phase signifying a move towards a decrease in the 
intensity of the conflict in this phase. 
 
Frames for the Region 
 The second category of “subjects” for which frames were identified in the 15-year 
coverage was the region of Kashmir, a land that lies in the extreme north end of India and 
Pakistan. About two-thirds of the region, which has a distinct history and a tradition of 
religious tolerance, lies within India, while Pakistan controls almost one-third. The 
remaining stretches to the north east are controlled by China. The state of Jammu and 
Kashmir is an Indian administrative unit, with Jammu as the winter capital of the state 
  41
and the city of Srinagar, which is in the Kashmir valley, the summer capital. Although 
there are linguistic and cultural similarities between Kashmir and Jammu, while Kashmir 
is a Muslim majority area, Jammu has a majority of Hindus.  
 
1989-1990 
 In the first phase, 12 words for the region occurred 54 times, and the most 
commonly occurring word was “state” (18 times), signifying an identification of the 
region as a Political Entity that is part of a larger nation. The second frequent description 
was “valley” (11 times), which portrays the Kashmir region as a Geographical Entity. 
The most commonly occurring modifiers for the region in this period were those that 
described Kashmir as a region where the majority of the population followed the Islamic 
faith. Modifiers such as “Muslim-dominated,” “predominantly Muslim,” and “Muslim 
majority,” were grouped to form the “Religious Identity” frame that appears 20 out of a 
total of 45 times in this period. 
 
1991-1998 
In the second period, out of 74 times, Kashmir was described 25 times as a 
“territory,” 19 times as a “region” and 14 times and as a “state,” implying that it was 
more likely to be described as a Geographic Entity than as a Political Entity in this 
period. Continuing the trend of describing Kashmir as a Muslim region, modifiers that 
represent the Religious Identity frame occur a total of 21 times in this period followed 
by “disputed” that is repeated 16 times and fits into the Disagreement frame. 
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Table 4: Frames for the Kashmir region 
 
1989-1990 
 Major Frames Constituent words  
1. Political Entity state Noun 
2. Geographic 
Entity 
valley 
 
Modifiers 1. Religious 
Identity 
Muslim-dominated 
predominantly 
Muslim 
Muslim majority 
 
1991-1998 
 Major Frames Constituent words  
1. Geographic 
Entity 
territory 
region 
Noun 
2. Political Entity state 
1. Religious 
Identity 
Muslim-dominated 
predominantly 
Muslim 
Muslim majority 
Modifiers 
2. Disagreement disputed 
 
1999-2001 
 Major Frames Constituent words Minor Frames Constituent 
words 
Noun 1. Geographic 
Entity 
region 
territory 
1. Political 
Entity 
state 
1. Disagreement disputed Modifiers 
2. Religious 
Identity 
Muslim 
Muslim-dominated 
1. Geographical 
Entity 
Himalayan 
mountainous 
2002-2003 
 Major Frames Constituent words Minor Frames Constituent 
words 
Noun 1. Geographic 
Entity 
region 
territory 
1. Political 
Entity 
state 
1. Disagreement disputed Modifiers 
2. Religious 
Identity 
Muslim 
1. Geographic 
Entity 
Himalayan 
beautiful 
rugged 
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1999-2001 
 The third phase did not show much change in the identification of Kashmir as a 
Geographic Entity, except that in this period “region” occurred more frequently (32 
times) than “territory” (22 times). The Political Entity frame was a distant third with the 
word “state” appearing only 8 out of 98 times as a descriptor for Kashmir. In this period, 
the Disagreement frame comprising the word “disputed,” (33) surpassed the Religious 
Identity frame with 21 occurrences of modifiers describing the Kashmir region. 
Descriptions that fit into the Geographic Entity frame such as “Himalayan” and 
“mountainous” occur 16 times, reinforcing the identification of Kashmir as a piece of 
land.  
 
2002-2003 
 In the last phase of coverage, Kashmir continues to be described as a Geographic 
Entity – as a “region” (41 times) and as a “territory” (19 times) – but its description as a 
“state” (18 times), although less frequent than region or territory, is noteworthy because it 
shows a gradual movement towards describing Kashmir once again as a Political Entity. 
With the modifiers, the region continues to be described in terms of the Disagreement 
frame – “disputed” (38) followed by the Religious Identity frame – “Muslim” (27), and 
finally through the Geographic Entity frame –  “Himalayan,” “rugged,” and “beautiful” 
for a total of 16 times. 
 
 
  44
Frames for India and Indians 
 The third “subject” for which words were identified and grouped under thematic 
clusters was India or Indians. In 1989, Jammu and Kashmir was and still is a state in the 
Indian union, although Pakistan controls a significant amount of its territory. It is 
important to look at the frames used for India because it is a major player in the Kashmir 
conflict and because the insurgency in Kashmir is being waged in order to sever the 
region from India and either establish it as an independent nation or integrate it into 
Pakistan. In the last 15 years, India has refused to let go of the region, despite heavy 
civilian and military casualties, allegations of human rights violations, constant efforts by 
Pakistan to get India to negotiate and even an undeclared war fought with Pakistan on the 
snowy Kargil heights. 
 
1989-1990 
 In this period, the most commonly occurring frame for India was the Military 
Establishment frame formed by combining “troops” (51 times), “army” (18 times), 
“security forces” (12 times) and “soldiers” (10 times). The second widely used frame 
included “government” (52 times), “leaders” (8) and “officials” (14), which were 
grouped with “government” to form a “Civilian Establishment” frame for describing 
India. India was described using 29 modifiers that were quoted 216 times. India is 
described as a “Hindu” country 20 times, signifying the prevalence of the Religious 
Identity frame in this period. The frame includes modifiers such as “Hindu,” “Hindu 
dominated,” and “predominantly Hindu.” 
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There were two major frames for the description of the actions of Indians in 
Kashmir – one was that of a Violently Repressor and the other was that of a Law and 
Order Maintainer. The first frame, made up of words like “killed,” “burned,” “shoot,” 
“fired” and their synonyms (51 occurrences), had a higher prevalence as compared to the 
second one, which was made up of words like “sealed off,” “arrested,” “to guard,” and  
“patrolling,” with 42 occurrences. 
 
1991-1998 
 In this period, 53 words were used 389 times to refer to India in a total of 39 
articles. As in the last period, the Military Establishment frame, constituted by the 
words “troops” (85), “army” (39), “security forces” (30), “soldiers” (23) and ‘forces” 
(13), dominated the Civilian Establishment frame, comprising the words “government” 
(65), “officials” (31) and “leaders” (9). Continuing the use of the Religious Identity 
frame, India is described as a “Hindu nation” (29) in the second phase of the period under 
study. Other modifiers that reflect the Military Establishment frame for India are 
“military/paramilitary” used 21 times to describe Indian troops in Kashmir. 
 While the two frames that emerged in the first phase continue to be present in the 
second one, this period shows a much higher dominance of the Violent Repressor frame, 
composed of words such as “shot,” “raped,” “tortured,” and “assaulted” (a total of 71 
occurrences) as compared to the Law and Order Maintainer frame, which included 
words like “banned,” “monitored,” and “sealed off” (a total of 30 occurrences). The third 
frame that emerges in this period is identification of India as a Diplomatic Entity, 
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reacting to the events in Kashmir and putting forth its opinion and judgments on the 
issues involved. This frame was constructed from words such as “accused,” “claimed,” 
“insisting,” and “refused,” which together were used 67 times. 
Table 5: Frames for India and Indians 
 
1989-1990 
 Major Frames Constituent Words 
1. Military Establishment troops, army, security forces, soldiers Noun 
2. Civilian Establishment government, officials, leaders 
Modifiers 1. Religious Identity Hindu, Hindu dominated, predominantly 
Hindu 
1. Violent Repressor killed, burned, looted Verbs 
2. Law and Order 
Maintainer 
Sealed off, arrested, to guard, patrolling 
1991-1998 
 Major Frames Constituent words 
1. Military Establishment troops, army, security forces, soldiers, forces Noun 
2. Civilian Establishment government, officials, leaders 
3. Religious Identity Hindu, Hindu dominated, predominantly 
Hindu 
Modifiers 
2. Military Establishment military, paramilitary 
1. Violent Repressor shot, raped, killed, tortured, assaulted 
2. Law and Order 
Maintainer 
banned, monitored 
Verbs 
3. Diplomatic Entity accused, claimed, insisting 
1999-2001 
 Major Frames Constituent words 
1. Military Establishment soldiers, troops, army, forces, security forces Noun 
2. Civilian Establishment leaders, government, officials, power 
1. Religious Identity Hindu, Hindu dominated, predominantly 
Hindu 
Modifiers 
2. Nuclear Risk nuclear, nuclear-armed 
1. Conciliatory Posturing defused, urged, claimed, agreed 
2. Aggressive Posturing blamed, refused, accused, denied 
3. Continuing Warfare have been fighting, shelling, battling 
4. Violent Repressor killed, shot, fired  
Verbs 
5. Law and Order 
Maintainer 
imposed, arrested, impounded  
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Table 4: Frames for India and Indians (continued)
2002-2003 
 Major Frames Constituent words 
1. Military Establishment troops, soldiers, security forces, army, 
military 
Noun 
2. Civilian Establishment government, leaders, officials 
1. Nuclear Risk nuclear, nuclear-armed Modifiers 
2. Religious Identity Hindu, Hindu dominated, predominantly 
Hindu 
1. Aggressive Posturing glared, rejected, have refused, have ruled out 
2. Conciliatory Posturing agrees, cut back, welcomed 
3. Continuing Warfare are fighting, are waging, mobilized, massing 
4. Violent Repressor killed, shot dead, attacked 
Verbs 
5. Law and Order 
Maintainer 
patrolled, policed, monitors 
 
1999-2001 
 The Military Establishment frame (117) was slightly more prevalent in this 
period of news coverage – and was revealed by the naming of Indians as “soldiers” (45 
times), “troops” (27), “army” (22), ‘forces” (14) and “security forces” (9) – than the 
Civilian Establishment frame (113), which was constituted by words such as “leaders” 
(43 times), “government” (40 times), “officials” (17 times) and “power” (13 times). A 
total of 47 descriptors for India were used 304 times in this period of coverage. The most 
common adjectives used to describe India in this period remained the ones that form the 
Religious Identity frame (20), followed for the first time by the use of “nuclear” to 
describe India. The words “nuclear” and “nuclear-armed” occur 19 times and can be 
grouped under the Nuclear Risk frame. 
 In this phase, the Diplomatic Entity frame was split to reflect the nature of the 
actions being done by Indians. Words describing positive and neutral actions, for 
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example, “claimed,” “defused,” “urged,” “contends,” “agreed,” and “allowed” (68 
occurrences), were grouped into the Conciliatory Posturing frame, whereas words that 
convey a defensive and confrontational stance or a refusal to move away from one’s 
entrenched position, such as “denied,” “accused,” “refused,” and “blamed” (52 
occurrences), were grouped into an Aggressive Posturing frame. Although the Law and 
Order Maintainer frame (21 usages) as well as the Violent Repressor frame (25 
usages) continued to be present in this period in the words used to describe the actions of 
the Indian government, both were less prominent than the two frames describing the 
diplomatic functions of the Indian government. Another frame to emerge in this period 
was that of Continuing Warfare that is exemplified by usage of words like “shelling,” 
“have been waging,” “battling,” and “fought” (used 32 times) that conveyed the 
impression that India was engaged in a protracted battle or fight with the Kashmiris and 
the Pakistanis. 
 
2002-2003 
 In what has been a trend that has remained consistent throughout the 15-year 
period under study, the Military Establishment frame for Indians was more prominent 
than the Civilian Establishment frame in this period to the extent that the former (182) 
occurred nearly twice the number of times for the latter (92). For the former frame, the 
most frequently used word was “troops” (43 times), followed by “soldiers” (41 times), 
“security forces” (33 times), ‘army” (21 times and “military” (9 times). For the second 
frame, “government” occurred 40 times but “leaders” was used 21 times and “officials” 
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31 times. For the first time in the 15-year period under study, among the modifiers, the 
Religious Identity frame vis-à-vis adjectives for India takes second position to the 
Nuclear Risk frame, with the words describing India as a Hindu country occurring 19 
times but those identifying it as a nuclear power occurring 37 times. 
 The most prominent frame to emerge in this period for Indians is that of 
Aggressive Posturing, comprising words such as “glaring,” “asserted,” “demanded,” 
“have ruled out,” “have refused,” and “rejected” that have 102 occurrences. The second 
major frame is that of Conciliatory Posturing, made up of words like “agrees,” 
“claimed,” “cut back,” “welcomed,” “has accepted,” “hoped,” “offered,” and “pulled 
back” that occurred a grand total of 63 times. Compared to the prominence of these two 
frames, the other three frames for India in this period – Continuing Warfare (38), Law 
and Order Maintainer (24) and Violent Repressor (24) – can be regarded as minor 
frames.  
 
Frames for Pakistan and Pakistanis 
 Another major party in the Kashmir dispute is Pakistan, India’s neighbor to the 
west and a nation founded in 1947 on the principle that South Asian Muslims needed a 
land of their own separate from India, where majority of the population is of the Hindu 
faith, although the country is a secular democracy where every citizen has the equal right 
to practice his or her faith. Since its creation, Pakistan has asserted that Kashmir belongs 
to it for the reason Kashmir is a Muslim majority province and Pakistan is an Islamic 
nation. Although founded as a democracy, Pakistan has been ruled by its military for 
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most of its 57-year existence as a nation. A democracy under Prime Minister Benazir 
Bhutto when the armed rebellion in Kashmir started in 1989 and later ruled by the 
government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan was taken over in a coup in 
October 1999 by then Pakistani Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf who declared 
himself the Chief Executive Officer of Pakistan. 
 
1989-1990 
 In the first phase of coverage, 19 words were used 53 times to describe Pakistan, 
compared to 216 times for Indians and 283 times for Kashmiris. Of the 19 words, the 
most commonly occurring was the word “government” (12 times), “officials” (6 times), 
and “leaders” (6 times), indicating that the Civilian Establishment frame was dominant 
over the Military Establishment frame composed of the words “army” (6 times) and 
“troops” (4 times). As with the modifiers used for India, Pakistan was also described as a 
“mostly Muslim,” and “Islamic” nation, reflecting the use of the Religious Identity 
frame (8 out of a total of 16). 
 Although the Pakistanis had a low profile in this period as compared to the 
Indians and Kashmiris, a couple of frames emerged for Pakistanis as well. A slightly 
higher prevalence was of the Active Supporter frame, which was made up of verbs such 
as “supported,” “armed,” “training,” and “helping,” with a total of 19 usages that 
conveyed the fact that Pakistan was providing finance, training and arms to the 
Kashmiris. The second frame was of a Diplomatic Entity and was composed of verbs 
like “charged,” “denied,” “accuses,” and “challenging,” a total of 17 occurrences. 
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1991-1998 
 In the second phase, the Civilian Establishment frame (30) was three times more 
visible than the Military Establishment frame (10), with “government” occurring 11 
times, “officials” 6 times, “villagers” 8 times and “civilians” 5 times. “Troops” (7) and 
“army” (3) were the third most commonly occurring words for Pakistanis, who had a 
total of 26 descriptors for this phase that were used 67 times. Continuing the use of the 
Religious Identity frame, in this phase also, Pakistan continues to be described as a 
“Muslim” country (8) and as a “nuclear” power (3) out of a total of 17 times.   
 
1999-2001 
 The Civilian Establishment continues to dominate references to Pakistanis in the 
coverage in the third period as well. The most commonly occurring word for Pakistanis 
in this phase is “leader(s)” occurring 56 times. The word “general,” used as a reference to 
General Pervez Musharraf, who took over power in Pakistan in October 1999 by 
overthrowing the popularly-elected government, appears 27 times. “Officials” (13) and 
ruler (9), again a reference to General Musharraf, are also part of the bigger Civilian 
Establishment frame which is constituted of a total of 137 references. The second most 
important frame used to name Pakistan is the Military Establishment frame (119) with 
“soldiers” occurring 42 times, “troops” 34 times, “forces” 15 times, “army” 12 times and 
“military” 16 times. The total number of descriptors for Pakistan in the third phase was 
67. These 67 descriptors were utilized a total of 419 times, 115 more than those for 
Indians and 194 more than those for Kashmiris.  
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 The most commonly used modifiers for Pakistan for this period again fit into the 
Religious Identity frame (39), and included words such as “holy,” “religious,” “Muslim-
dominated,” and “Muslim majority.” The second frame that is evident in the modifiers 
for Pakistan is the Military Establishment frame (31), with the use of the words “army” 
and “military” to describe Pakistanis. For the first time, one can see the occurrence of the 
Outside Interference frame here as exemplified by the modifiers “Pakistan-based,” and 
“Pakistan-supported” that occur 15 times. Other modifiers that occur, albeit to a lesser 
extent, are “militant” (8) and “terrorist” (7). 
 Demonstrating the growing Pakistani involvement in the Kashmir conflict from 
1999, the number of verbs for Pakistanis is this phase is 462, as compared to 378 for 
Indians and only 101 for Kashmiris. The most evident frame for Pakistanis in this phase 
was that of Conciliatory Posturing, formed by words that convey positive or neutral 
actions and gestures, such as “suggested,” “proposed,” “acknowledged,” and “claims,” 
used 105 times. The second major frame was that of Violent Neighbor, formed by words 
like “fired,” “shot,” “”shelling,” and “fought,” that occurred 76 times. The next major 
frame was the Active Supporter of Kashmiris frame, with 58 occurrences of related 
words, including for the first time words describing the movement of Kashmiri and other 
extremist fighters from Pakistan to India across their border that is referred to as the Line 
of Control. The last major frame was that of Aggressive Posturing, conveyed by words 
like “charged,” “accuses,” and “demanded,” used 43 times. 
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2002-2003 
 The Military Establishment frame (84) takes over from the Civilian 
Establishment frame (62) as the dominant one for describing Pakistan in the fourth and 
final phase of coverage. The total number of words used to describe Pakistanis in the 
final phase was 69 and these words were used 397 times. “Troops” appeared 28 times, 
“forces,” 19 times, “army,” 18 times, “military,” 12 times and “soldiers,” 7 times forming 
the Military Establishment frame. Part of the Civilian Establishment frame, 
“Government” appeared 37 times while “leader(s)” was used 25 times. However, a close 
rival to the Military Establishment frame and one that surpasses the Civilian 
Establishment frame is a new frame composed of words such as “militants” (53), 
“jihadis” (14), “fighters” (5), “extremists” (6) and “guerrillas” (4). These words form a 
group called the Militant Extremists frame (82).  
Among modifiers, the three most common frames in decreasing order of 
prominence are Religious Identity, with the words Islamic or Muslim (44); Nuclear 
Risk, with the words “nuclear,” “nuclear-armed,” “nuclear-capable;” and finally, the 
Militant Extremists frame, with the modifiers “militant” appearing 22 times and 
“extremist” 10 times. This compliments the presence of the same frame in the nouns used 
to describe Pakistan. 
 The most prominent verb frame for the Pakistanis in this period was that of 
Conciliatory Posturing, as evident through the use of words for positive and neutral 
actions such as “promised,” “admitted,” “eased,” “has pledged,” “to improve,” and “to 
resolve” (106 occurrences). The second most prominent frame was a new one called 
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Cracking Down, which was constructed from words that expressed the Pakistani 
Government’s actions in this phase aimed at curbing the activities of Islamic extremist 
organizations like Lashkar-e-Toiba, Al Qaeda, Jaish-e-Mohammed and others. This 
frame was composed of verbs like “to end,” “cracked down,” “banned,” “has reined in,” 
“have closed,” “shut down,” and “stopped” (95 occurrences). The third prominent frame 
was that of Aggressive Posturing, made of “denied,” “demanded,” “facing off,” 
“rejected” (71 times) – followed by that of Active Supporter made of “arming,” 
“training,” “backing”(61 times) – and finally, that of Violent Neighbor – “fired,” 
“killed,” “mobilizing,” “opened fire,” “to bleed,” and “waging” ( 44 times). 
Table 6: Frames for Pakistan and Pakistanis 
 
1989-1990 
 Major Frame Constituent 
words 
 
1. Civilian 
Establishment 
government 
officials 
leaders 
Noun 
2. Military 
Establishment 
Army 
troops 
Modifiers 1. Religious 
Identity 
mostly Muslim 
Islamic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Active 
Supporter 
training 
helping 
arming 
Verbs 
2. Diplomatic 
Entity 
charged 
denied 
accuses 
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Table 6: Frames for Pakistan and Pakistanis (continued)
1991-1998 
 Major frame Constituent 
words 
Minor frames Constituent 
words 
Noun 1. Civilian 
Establishment 
government 
officials 
villagers 
civilians 
1. Military 
Establishment 
troops 
army 
Modifiers 1. Religious 
Identity 
Muslim 
predominantly 
Muslim 
1. Nuclear Risk nuclear 
nuclear-
armed 
1. Active 
Supporter 
providing 
supporting 
harboring 
2. Diplomatic 
Entity 
claimed 
denied 
demanded 
Verbs 
3. Violent 
Neighbor 
bombarded 
fought 
shelled 
 
1999-2001 
 Major Frames Constituent 
words 
Minor Frames Constituent 
words 
1. Civilian 
Establishment 
leader(s) 
general 
officials 
ruler 
Noun 
2. Military 
Establishment 
soldiers 
troops 
military 
army 
  
Modifiers 1. Religious 
Identity 
Muslim 
Islamic 
holy 
1. Outside 
Interference 
Pakistan-
based 
Pakistan-
supported 
1. Conciliatory 
Posturing 
suggested 
proposed 
2. Violent 
Neighbor 
fired  
shot 
shelled 
Verbs 
3. Active 
Supporter 
helping 
arming 
1. Aggressive 
Posturing 
Demanded 
charges 
accused 
refused 
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Table 6: Frames for Pakistan and Pakistanis (continued)
2002-2003 
 Major Frames Constituent 
words 
Minor Frames Constituent 
words 
1. Military 
Establishment 
troops 
forces 
army 
military 
soldiers 
2. Militant 
Extremists 
militants 
Jihadis 
fighters 
extremists 
guerrillas 
Noun 
3. Civilian 
Establishment 
government 
leader(s) 
1. Religious 
Identity 
Islamic 
Muslim 
2. Nuclear Risk nuclear 
nuclear-armed 
Modifiers 
3. Militant 
Extremists 
militant 
extremist 
  
1. Conciliatory 
Posturing 
promised 
admitted 
has pledged 
1. Active 
Supporter 
training 
backing  
arming 
2. Cracking Down banned 
rein in 
to end 
stop 
Verbs 
3. Aggressive 
Posturing 
facing off 
demanded 
blamed 
2. Violent 
neighbor 
fired 
waging 
mobilizing 
opened fire 
 
 
 
Frames for Kashmir and Kashmiris 
  The Kashmiris have always regarded themselves as entitled to a special status 
within the Indian union and have expressed nationalistic aspirations since 1947, when 
Kashmir became a part of India (Schofield, 2003). In the decades of the 1950s, 1960s, 
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1970s and 1980s, the Government of India eroded Kashmir’s special status through 
Constitutional amendments, a trend that bred resentment among Kashmiris who were also 
disillusioned by the corrupt and inefficient state administrations, lack of civic amenities 
and rising unemployment. To add insult to injury, the state legislative body elections in 
1987 were rigged by the party in power at that time in New Delhi, further angering 
Kashmiris who finally took to the streets in 1989 and 1990. There were almost daily mass 
demonstrations by thousands of people on the streets of Srinagar and other Kashmiri 
towns, and militant organizations of Kashmiri youth took up arms in order to separate 
Kashmir from India through violent means such as kidnappings and shootings.  
Table 7: Frames for Kashmir or Kashmiris 
 
1989-1990 
 Major Frames Constituent 
words 
Minor frames Constituent 
words 
1.Armed 
Combatant 
militants 1.Organized 
Activity 
groups 
leaders 
organization(s) 
Noun 
2.Ordinary 
Kashmiris 
civilians 
residents 
demonstrators 
mourners 
2. Separatist 
Rebels 
separatists 
insurgents 
1. Religious 
Identity 
Muslim 
mostly Muslim 
Modifiers 
2. Mass-based 
Action 
separatist 
pro-independence 
 
1. Violent 
Protester 
bombed 
kidnapped 
shot 
Verbs 
2. Non-violent 
Protester 
demonstrated 
demanded 
protested 
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Table 7: Frames for Kashmir and Kashmiris (continued)
1991-1998 
 Major Frames Constituent 
words 
Minor frames Constituent 
words 
1.Armed 
Combatant 
militants 
guerrillas 
fighters 
1. Ordinary 
Kashmiris 
civilians 
2. Separatist 
Rebels 
separatists 
rebels 
insurgents 
Noun 
3. Organized 
Activity 
groups 
leaders 
2. Religious 
Identity 
Muslims 
Hindus 
1. Religious 
Identity 
Muslim 
Muslim majority 
Modifiers 
2. Internal 
Revolt 
guerrilla 
militant 
1. Mass-based 
Action 
separatist 
rebel 
pro-
independence 
 
1. Violent 
Protester 
killed 
assassinated 
fired 
Verbs 
2. Non-violent 
Protester 
claimed 
are boycotting 
condemned 
 
1999-2001 
 Major Frames Constituent 
words 
Minor frames Constituent 
words 
1. Organized 
Activity 
groups 
organization(s) 
1. Ordinary 
Kashmiris 
civilians 
2. Separatist 
Rebels 
insurgents 
rebels 
Noun 
2. Armed 
Combatant 
militants 
guerrillas 
fighters 3. Religious 
Identity 
Muslims 
Hindus 
1. Mass-based 
Action 
separatist  
freedom 
anti-India 
 Modifiers 
2. Religious 
Identity 
Islamic 
Muslim 
1. Internal 
Revolt 
militant 
guerrilla 
1. Violent 
Protester 
ambushed 
gunned down 
attacked 
Verbs 
2. Non-violent 
Protester 
to wrench 
argued 
defying 
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Table 7: Frames for Kashmir and Kashmiris (continued)
2002-2003 
 Major Frames Constituent 
words 
Minor frames Constituent 
words 
1. Armed 
Combatant 
militant  
guerrillas 
fighters  
2. Civilian 
Establishment 
government 
candidates   
leaders 
Noun 
3. Ordinary 
Kashmiris 
civilians 
voters 
  
1. Religious 
Identity 
Islamic 
Muslim 
1. Internal 
Revolt 
militant Modifiers 
2. Civilian 
Establishment 
political 
newly-elected 
coalition 
2. Mass-based 
Action 
separatist 
 1. Violent 
Protester 
slaughtered 
terrorized 
massacred 
  
Verbs 2. Non-violent 
Protester 
seeking 
espoused 
calling for 
1. Continuing 
Warfare 
are fighting 
are battling 
are staging 
 
1989-1990 
 In the first two years of coverage, the number of times 48 nouns were used for 
Kashmiris was 283, more than the count for Indians (210) and far above the count for 
Pakistanis (53). The most commonly used word for Kashmiris in this phase was 
“militants” (84) which was put into an Armed Combatant frame. A distant second was 
the word “separatist” which was used 27 times and slotted into a minor frame called the 
Separatist Rebels frame. Words such as “civilians,” “residents,” “demonstrators,” 
“mourners,” “mobs” appeared a total of 40 times, forming a cluster called the Ordinary 
Kashmiris. Also noteworthy were words like “groups” (17), “leaders” (16) and 
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“organization” (3) that reflected an element of organization to the armed rebellion started 
by the Kashmiris in 1989. These were put into a minor frame called Organized Activity 
(36). The most common frame formed by the modifiers used to describe the Kashmiris in 
this phase is the Religious Identity frame (33), comprising words such as “Muslim” and 
“mostly Muslim,” followed by the Mass-based Action frame, comprising the modifiers 
“separatist” (16) and “pro-independence” (7). 
 By grouping the verbs used to state the actions of the people of Kashmir in this 
period, two frames emerged. One was that of Non-violent Protester and the other was 
that of Violent Protester. The Non-violent Protester frame was constructed from words 
like “demonstrated,” “protested,” “demanded,” “defying,” “complained” and other such 
words with 41 occurrences that conveyed the apparent dissatisfaction of the people of 
Kashmiris with the current state of affairs and their desire to bring about a change. The 
second frame conveyed the parallel militant stream of the Kashmiri separatist/freedom 
movement, and included words like “bombed,” “kidnapped,” “shot,” and “assassinated” 
that occurred a total of 27 times. 
 
1991-1998 
 In the second phase, 55 words were quoted a total of 421 times in describing 
Kashmiris. The most commonly occurring word was once again “militants” (70) which 
was grouped with “guerrillas” (47) and “fighters” (5) into the Armed Combatant frame 
(122). The second thematic cluster, called Separatist Rebels (72) in the second phase of 
media coverage, is composed of the words “rebels” (39), “separatists” (21) and 
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“insurgents” (12). The third frame that was evident in the period from 1991 to 1998 was 
the Organized Activity frame (56) that included the words “groups” (34) and “leaders” 
(22). The Ordinary Kashmiris frame was also present, albeit to a lesser extent, with a 
total of 47 occurrences, the most commonly occurring word being “civilians” (23 times). 
Another minor frame that bears mention in this phase is the Religious Identity frame 
(41) with the people of Kashmir being described as Muslims 26 times and Hindus 15 
times.  
 Of the 201 times that modifiers were used to describe Kashmiris in this phase, the 
highest frequency was of the words that are part of the Religious Identity frame (80), 
composed mainly of the word “Muslim” (56), and also by the word “Hindu” that 
indicates reference to Kashmir’s religious minority – Hindu Brahmins called Pandits, 
who fled Kashmir in hordes after the armed insurgency started in 1989. The second 
prominent frame formed by the modifiers used to describe the Kashmir and Kashmiris 
was the Internal Revolt frame, composed of the modifiers “guerrilla” (19) and “militant” 
(17) and signifying the manner in which the insurgency was conducted by armed groups 
in Kashmir. Mass-based Action, the third important frame in this period, included the 
modifiers “separatist” (20), “rebel” (8) and “pro-independence” (2). 
 Non-violent Protester and Violent Protester continued to be the two frames for 
the Kashmiris in this phase as well, with the latter still dominating over the former. While 
the Violent Protester was made up of words such as “torched,” “ambushed,” “attacked,” 
“detonated,” and “gunned down,” (with 60 occurrences), the Non-violent Protester frame 
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included words like “have demanded,” “condemned,” “to wrench,” and “are boycotting,” 
with a total of 39 usages. 
 
1999-2001 
 The Organized Activity and the Armed Combatant frames occurred with the 
same frequency in the third phase. Words like “militants” (26), “guerrillas” (15) and 
“fighters” (15) formed the Armed Combatant frame, while words such as “groups” (28), 
“leaders” (22) and “organizations” (6) formed the Organized Activity frame. The third 
frame that occurred to half the extent of the first two ones and therefore was a minor 
frame was the Ordinary Kashmiris frame (24), with the word “civilians” again 
occurring with the highest frequency. Another minor frame in this period was the 
Separatist Rebel frame (22), with the word “insurgents” occurring 11 times and the 
word “rebels” occurring 10 times. The Religious Identity frame (14) emerged as the 
third minor frame in this period, with 10 occurrences of the word “Muslims” and 4 of the 
word “Hindus.” The total number of descriptors for Kashmiris in this phase was 45 and 
the number of timed they were used was 225. 
 In this phase, the modifiers can be grouped into two almost equally prominent 
frames – the Mass-based Action frame (33), which includes words such as “separatist,” 
“freedom,” and “anti-India;” and the Religious Identity frame (32), with words such as 
“Islamic” and “Muslim.” A third but minor frame that appears in this phase is the 
Internal Revolt frame (23) that includes the adjectives “militant” and “guerrilla” for 
describing individuals and groups carrying out the armed movement in Kashmir. 
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 The verbs used for Kashmiris in this period can be grouped into the same two 
frames that were present in the first two phases. The more prominent frame is once again 
that of Violent Protester, with words like “raided,” “shot,” and “fighting” used 33 times, 
followed by that of the Non-violent Protester, with words such as “argued,” 
“demanding,” “defying” and “disagree” appearing 19 times.  
 
2002-2003 
 In the fourth and final phase, 83 descriptors for Kashmiris were used a total of 
563 times, with the Armed Combatant frame (168) emerging as the strongest in this 
period. Within this frame, “militant” occurred 123 times; “guerrillas,” 25 times; 
“fighters,” 11 times; and “militias,” 9 times. Although much weaker than the Armed 
Combatant frame, the second powerful frame in this phase was the Civilian 
Establishment frame (82), with “government” occurring 31 times; “candidates,” 20 
times; “party,” 19 times; and “leaders,” 12 times. The Ordinary Kashmiris frame came 
in third in the this phase, with 59 occurrences dominated by the word “civilians” (28) 
followed by the word “voters” (10). 
 The most common modifier frame for this period is again the Religious Identity 
(57) frame, formed by the religious modifiers used to describe Kashmir and Kashmiris, 
such as “Islamic” (37), and “Muslim” (18). Complementing the surfacing of this frame in 
the nouns used to describe Kashmiris, the second most prominent frame among modifiers 
for this phase is the Civilian Establishment frame (32), formed by adjectives such as 
“political,” “newly-elected,” and “coalition.” The Internal Revolt frame, exemplified by 
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the adjective “militant” (31), is a minor frame for this phase of the period under study.  
The other minor frame for this period is the Mass-based Action frame, represented by 
the word “separatist,” which appears 22 times. 
 Continuing the trend set in the three previous phases, Kashmir and its people 
continue to be described as Violent Protesters, who have “shot,” “killed,” “slaughtered,” 
“terrorized,” and “massacred” (88 occurrences) people, including thousands of Indian 
security forces, security personnel and Kashmiri civilians. The second major frame to 
emerge was that of Non-violent Protester, indicated specifically by words like “calling 
for,” “demonstrated,” “espoused,” “seeking,” and “opposed” (54 usages). There were two 
minor frames in this period, with the more prominent among them being Continuing 
Warfare that was conveyed through the use of words like “have been waging,” “are 
fighting,” “are battling,” and “staging” (33 occurrences) that give the impression that the 
people of Kashmir have been involved in a long, violent campaign to achieve an end. The 
final minor frame is that of Violent Outsiders that is conveyed through the use of words 
like “cross into,” and “infiltrated.” 
 
Frames for the United States 
 Although South Asia has not traditionally been a region of high U.S. interest, 
Pakistan was allied with the United States in the Cold War era and provided crucial 
assistance to America in its fight against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan waged through 
the local mujhahideen (Islamic warriors). The testing of nuclear weapons by both India 
and Pakistan in May 1998 caused U.S. attention to be focused on the region and 
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particularly on Kashmir which had been a traditional flashpoint between India and 
Pakistan. 
 For all the periods under study, the most commonly occurring descriptors for the 
United States were “administration,” “government,” “officials,” and “diplomats,” all of 
which fit into the Civilian Establishment frame for the United States in all four phases. 
There were no significant modifiers for the United States in the entire 15-year period. 
The United States came across as a Concerned Advisor through the usage of words like 
“urged,” “warned,” “are worried,” and “alarmed” (12 usages) in the first phase (1989-
1990). Concerned Advisor was the frame that surfaced in the second phase (1991-1998) 
from the analysis of the verbs such as “appealing,” “to ease,” “has encouraged,” and “to 
settle” used for Americans (15 occurrences). 
The role of the United States in the third phase (1999-2001) of the 15-year period 
of media coverage under study exceeds that of even the Kashmiris regarding verbs. While 
96 verbs were used for Kashmiris in this phase, the number was 125 for Americans. The 
frame of Concerned Advisor still dominates usage with verbs like “called for,” 
“assured,” “suggested,” “urged,” “agreed,” and “underscore” (68 occurrences). However, 
there is an undercurrent of firmness in the verbs used for Americans in this phase that 
was captured in words such as “asserted,” “pressured,” “rejecting,” “to impose,” 
“warned,” used a total of 21 times and labeled the Assertive Advisor frame. In the fourth 
phase (2002-2003), the United States once again came across overwhelmingly as a 
Concerned Advisor “urging,” “assuaging,” “mediating,” (76 occurrences) between India 
and Pakistan. Other words for Americans in this phase include “to defuse,” ‘to persuade,” 
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“discussed,” “called on,” and “offered,” all fitting into the Concerned Advisor frame and 
signifying the role of a nation playing a pacifist role.  
 
Frames for other parties in the Kashmir conflict 
 All the actors in the Kashmir conflict that were not Indians, Pakistanis, Kashmiris 
or Americans, were placed in this category.  
1989-1990 
 Of the total occurrence of words for other parties (23), the descriptor “reporters” 
occurred 7 times followed by “journalists” at 6 times and “news organizations,” 2 times 
making the News Media the most commonly occurring other actor on the scene. There 
were no significant modifiers in this phase of media coverage. No significant frames 
emerged from the verbs used for the other parties involved in Kashmir in this phase of the 
coverage. 
Table 8: Frames for Other Parties in the Kashmir conflict
1989-1990 
 Major Frames Constituent 
words 
 
Noun 1. News Media reporters 
journalists 
 
1991-1998 
 Major Frames Constituent 
words 
 
Noun 1. Human 
Rights Concerns 
groups 
Modifiers 1. Human 
Rights Concerns 
human rights 
1. Concerned 
Advisor 
suggested 
urged 
Verbs 
2. Critical 
Observer 
denounced 
criticized 
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Table 8: Frames for other parties in the Kashmir conflict (continued)
1999-2001 
 Major Frames Constituent 
words 
Minor Frames Constituent 
words 
1. Separatist 
Rebel 
insurgents 
rebels 
separatists 
Noun 1. Foreign 
Soldiers 
guerrillas 
fighters 
militants 
forces 
mujahideen 
2. Outside 
Interference 
infiltrators 
invaders 
1. Religious 
Identity 
Islamic 
Muslim 
holy 
1. Separatist 
Rebel 
freedom 
pro-Kashmir 
separatist 
Modifiers 
2. Outside 
Interference 
Pakistan-based 
pro-Pakistan 
 
Verbs 1. Violent 
Outsiders 
hijacked 
shot down 
 
2002-2003 
 Major Frames Constituent 
words 
Minor Frames Constituent 
words 
Noun 1. Foreign 
Soldiers 
guerrillas 
militants 
fighters 
 
 1. Concerned 
Advisor 
lauded 
warned 
reassured 
 
 
 
1991-1998 
 A total of 20 words were used 74 times to refer to other parties, with the 
descriptors “groups” at 15, “tourists” at 14, “hostages” at 10, and “Afghans” at 8, the last 
one referring to the mujahideen from Afghanistan who came to Kashmir after the 
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989. Complementing the occurrence of 
groups as the most prominent noun was the use of “human rights” as the most commonly 
occurring modifier (16) implying that most of the outside actors in the conflict were 
international human rights organizations. Thus, the frame Human Rights Concerns 
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emerged from the analysis of descriptors and modifiers used to describe other players 
involved in the Kashmir conflict. 
 Although the other players in this phase were also mainly cast in the role of a 
Concerned Advisor conveyed by words such as “suggested” and “urged,” (10 usages), 
another frame that emerged was that of a Critical Observer exemplified by words like 
“denounced,” “criticized,” and “investigate,” used 8 times. 
 
1999-2001 
 Indicating the growing participation of outside elements in the Kashmir conflict in 
this phase, 31 words were used 193 times as descriptors for other actors on the scene. The 
overwhelmingly occurring thematic group or frame was the Foreign Soldiers frame 
(134) which included words like “guerrillas” (35), “fighters” (25), “militants” (24), 
“forces” (15), “hijackers” (15), “mujahideen” (12) and “warriors” (8). Two minor frames 
to emerge from this phase were the Separatist Rebel frame (13) with the words 
“insurgents” (7), “rebels” (3), and “separatists” (3). The second minor frame was the 
Outside Interference frame (10) including the words “infiltrators” (6), “intruders” (3) 
and “invaders” (1).  
 The most frequently occurring modifiers in this period are religious ones (40 
times) – for example, “Islamic,” “Muslim” and “holy” — providing evidence of the 
existence of the Religious Identity frame. Modifiers such as “Pakistan-based,” and “pro-
Pakistan,” constitute the Outside Interference frame (15) formed by the nouns that were 
used to identify the other players in this period. Complementing the Separatist Rebel 
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frame formed by the nouns in the preceding paragraphs are modifiers like “freedom” (5) 
“pro-Kashmir” (4) and “separatist” (2). Other modifiers used for others in this phase are 
“militant” (5), “guerrilla” (4), and “terrorist” (3) which were not grouped into any frames 
due to their low frequency of occurrence. 
 The verbs that were used for describing the actions of other parties in this phase 
of the U.S. media coverage of the Kashmir conflict were grouped into a Violent 
Outsiders frame that includes words describing acts of physical violence perpetrated by 
people other than Indian, Pakistani, Kashmiri or American such as “fighting,” “hijacked,” 
“shot down,” and “threatened,” used a grand total of 22 times. 
 
2002-2003 
 Out of a total of 15 words used 43 times to describe the other players, the highest 
numbers were again for the Foreign Soldiers frame (16) including “guerrillas” (6), 
“militants” (5) and “fighters” (5). “Terrorists” and “tourists” were the other two words 
that were mentioned four times each.  There were no prominent modifiers for this phase. 
 The other players on the scene have been mainly characterized as Concerned 
Advisors through words like “lauded,” “alarmed,” “reassured,” “urged,” “suggested,” 
“recognize” and “pressuring,” with these and related words being used 29 times. 
 
Sources Used to Cover the Kashmir Conflict 
In answer to the third research question, which was what were the nature and 
affiliation of the sources used by the U.S. media in their coverage of the Kashmir 
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conflict, the study found that all three newspapers – The New York Times, The 
Washington Post and the Los Angles Times – used both official and unofficial sources, 
but the relative distribution of official versus unofficial sources for each party to the 
conflict, namely Indians, Pakistanis and Kashmiris – as well as the external parties – the 
U.S. and other agents – was different in each period. The results of the analyses of the 
inter-party and intra-party distribution of sources have been grouped below according to 
the four previously identified phases of the coverage given to the Kashmir conflict. For 
each period and each party, the total number of sources, both official and unofficial, was 
determined. 
 
Sources used from 1989-1990 
The total number of sources quoted by The New York Times and The Washington 
Post in this two-year period was 111. Of these, 45 or 40 percent were affiliated with 
India, 33 or 29 percent with Kashmir, 14 or 12 percent with the U.S., 13 or 11 percent 
with Pakistan, and finally, 6 or 5 percent with other players or groups. Table 8 illustrates 
the sources used in this phase of media coverage. 
Indian sources 
Of the 45 Indian sources, 34 or 75 percent were official and were quoted a total of 
50 times, while 11 or 25 percent were unofficial and quoted 13 times. The most 
commonly quoted official sources were “officials” (7), “spokespersons” (7) and 
“ministers” (6) of the Indian Government (24) or the Civilian Establishment. Part of the 
Prime Minister’s cabinet, ministers are elected representatives of the people and are in-
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charge of different portfolios such as Defense, Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Travel and 
Tourism, and Civil Aviation. Another important official Indian source was the Governor 
of the Jammu and Kashmir state (13), who in each state in the Indian union is the 
representative of the central or federal government in New Delhi. After the insurgency in 
Kashmir started to take a violent turn, the elected local government was dissolved by the 
New Delhi government, which subsequently sent its representative – the Governor – to 
rule the state. Government-controlled media or State Media constitute the third 
frequently used official source while the Indian media not controlled by the Indian 
government or Private Media feature as the top unofficial source quoted 10 times. 
Pakistani sources  
Of the 13 Pakistani sources, 12 were official while only 1 was unofficial. Official 
sources were quoted 21 times, with the Pakistani Government or Civilian Establishment  
quoted 12 times followed by the Pakistani Army or Military Establishment quoted 10 
times.  
Kashmiri Sources 
Out of the 33 Kashmiri sources used in 1989-1990 by the three newspapers under 
study, 12 or 36 percent were official whereas 21 or 63 percent were unofficial. Local 
Government, constituted by the Jammu and Kashmir Police (10) who are a state-
controlled unit of the elected government of Jammu and Kashmir (9), was the most 
commonly quoted official source. Of the unofficial sources quoted 29 times, Average 
Citizens were quoted 16 times, followed by former officials (4), local media (3), 
separatist leaders (3) and religious leaders (3).  
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Table 9: Distribution of Sources in 1989-1990 
 
Affiliation Official No. Unofficial No. Total % 
India 1. Civilian 
Government 
• officials 
• spokespersons 
• ministers 
• Governor – 
Jammu and 
Kashmir state 
2.State Media 
34 1. Private Media 
2. Experts 
11 45 40
Pakistan 1. Civilian 
Establishment 
• officials 
2. The Military 
• Pakistani 
Army 
12 1. Private Media 
 
1 13 12
Kashmir 1.Local Government 
• Police 
• state 
government 
12 1. Average Citizens 
2.  former officials 
3.  local media 
4.  separatist leaders 
5.  religious leaders 
21 33 30
U.S. 1. Civilian 
Establishment 
• Administration 
officials 
• government 
officials 
2. Military 
Establishment 
• The Pentagon 
10 1. Private Media 4 14 13
Other 1. Diplomats 1 1. Private Media 
2. Experts 
5 6 5
Total  69  42 111 100
 
U.S. Sources 
The United States was represented by 10 official sources quoted 25 times, with 
officials from the U.S. Government (7), the U.S. Administration (10) and the House 
  73
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on South Asia (3) being quoted the most making the 
Civilian Establishment the major official source. The Military Establishment, 
represented by the Pentagon, was quoted 4 times. Of the unofficial sources, other U.S. 
media mainly the Associated Press or Private Media were quoted 5 times out of a total 
of 6. 
Other Sources 
There was only one official source – diplomats quoted 2 times – and 5 unofficial 
sources quoted 7 times. Other media and experts were quoted 3 times each. 
 
Sources used from 1991-1998 
The total number of sources used in this period in 39 stories was 171 of which 43 percent 
or 74 sources were affiliated with India, a little more than 10 percent or 18 belonging to 
Pakistani, 24 percent or 41 Kashmiri, 18 percent or 21 from the United States and 10 
percent or 17 others. The distribution of sources on the basis of their affiliation is 
demonstrated in the table below. 
Indian sources 
Of 74 Indian sources, 63 were officials quoted a total of 99 times. The Civilian 
Establishment or officials from the Indian Government were quoted most frequently (35 
times) followed by sources from the Military Establishment (21 times). The Jammu and 
Kashmir Governor at 12 times was the third most frequently quoted source but was 
considered part of the Civilian Establishment. Unofficial sources from India were only 11 
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and quoted 14 times, with the Indian media (Private Media) quoted 6 times and Indian 
Experts, 7 times. 
Pakistani Sources 
There were only 11 Pakistani official sources – all representatives of the Pakistani 
Government – with most of the quotes from ministers (7), officials (6) and envoys (2) 
constituting the Civilian Establishment. All Pakistani unofficial sources were Average 
Citizens, most likely people living in the Pakistani side of Kashmir.  
Kashmiri Sources 
The number of unofficial Kashmiri sources (32) heavily dominated the number of official 
sources (9). Of the unofficial sources which were quoted for a total of 62 times, Average 
Citizens again emerged as the most commonly quoted sources (32), followed by 
separatist leaders (19), and religious leaders (6). Official sources, who were quoted a 
mere 10 times in the entire eight-year period, were part of the Local Government. The 
Jammu and Kashmir Police was quoted 5 times, followed by the Jammu and Kashmir 
government at 3 times. 
U.S. Sources  
Unofficial sources from the United States (12) were more numerous and quoted a 
greater number of times (37) than official sources (9) quoted 19 times. Human Rights 
Groups emerge as the most frequently cited American sources, followed by the U.S. 
media (Private Media), 5 times, and experts, 5 times. The Civilian Establishment, 
comprising U.S. Government officials (11), followed by the State Department (4) and 
diplomats (2), was the only official U.S. source of information.   
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Table 10: Distribution of Sources in 1991-1998 
 
Affiliation Official No. Unofficial No. Total % 
India 1. Civilian 
Establishment 
• officials 
• ministers 
• spokespersons
• Governor – 
Jammu and 
Kashmir state 
2. Military 
Establishment 
63 1. Private Media 
2. Experts 
11 74 44
Pakistan 1. Civilian 
Establishment 
• ministers 
• officials 
• envoys 
11 1. Average 
Citizens 
7 18 10
Kashmir 1. Local Government 
• Police 
• state 
government 
9 1. Average 
Citizens 
2. separatist 
leaders 
5. religious leaders
32 41 24
U.S. 1. Civilian 
Establishment 
• government 
officials 
• State 
Department 
• diplomats 
9 1. Human Rights 
Groups 
2. Private Media 
3. Experts 
12 21 12
Other 1.Diplomats 4 1. Private Media  
2. Experts 
3. Human Rights 
Groups 
13 17 10
Total  96  75 171 100
 
Other Sources 
Unofficial sources are more numerous for this group as well, with 13 sources 
being quoted 18 times, most notably Private Media (10), especially the British news 
  76
agency, Reuters. Experts were quoted 5 times and Human Rights Groups 3 times. 
Diplomats (5) are the most widely quoted other official sources of information for the 
second phase of the media coverage of the Kashmir conflict. 
 
Sources used from 1999-2001 
In this period, a total of 262 sources were used by the three newspapers in their 
coverage of the Kashmir conflict. Of these 262 sources, 99 or 38 percent were Indian, 67 
or 25 percent were Pakistani (25%), 31 or 12 percent were from Kashmir, 44 or 17 
percent from the U.S. and 21 or 8 percent others. While Indian sources still dominate, the 
percentage of Pakistani sources showed a significant increase from the earlier period. 
Another noteworthy point is that for the first time both the percentage of Pakistani 
sources used and the percentage of U.S. sources used is higher than the percentage of 
Kashmiri sources used, as Table 11 illustrates. 
Indian Sources 
The number of official Indian sources (77) used by the U.S. media was once again 
much higher than the number of unofficial Indian sources used (22). Indian Government 
(Civilian Establishment) officials were once again the most widely quoted (46 times) 
and followed by ministers (36 times) and finally spokespersons (10 times). Among the 
ministers, the Prime Minister was quoted 12 times. The Military Establishment (21 
times) was the second major official source among the Indians for this phase. Of the 22 
unofficial sources, Average Citizens (12) emerged as the most frequently quoted 
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followed by Indian Experts and academics (9) and finally, the Indian media (Private 
Media) (5). 
Table 11: Distribution of Sources in 1999-2001
Affiliation Official No. Unofficial No. Total % 
India 1. Civilian 
Establishment 
• officials 
• ministers 
including 
Prime 
Minister 
• spokespersons
2. Military 
Establishment 
77 1. Average 
Citizens 
2. Experts 
3. Private Media 
22 99 38
Pakistan 1. Civilian 
Establishment 
• Pervez 
Musharraf 
• ministers 
• officials 
2. Military 
Establishment 
• Pakistani 
Army 
46 1. Private Media 
2. Average 
Citizens 
3. Experts 
4. Guerrillas 
21 67 25
Kashmir 1. Political leaders 
• All Parties 
Hurriyat 
Conference 
10 1. Average 
Citizens 
2. Separatists 
21 31 12
U.S. 1. Civilian 
Establishment 
• officials 
• President 
• Secret Service 
• diplomats 
• experts 
 
29 1. Experts 15 44 17
Other 1. Diplomats 13  8 21 8
Total  175  87 262 100
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Pakistani Sources 
In this period, of the 46 official sources from Pakistan quoted a total of 103 times, 
the Civilian Establishment or Pakistani Government sources were the most frequently 
quoted, with Pakistani military ruler General Pervez Musharraf dominating as the largest 
single source of information (30). Pakistani ministers were quoted a total of 21 times, 
followed by Pakistani officials (20). An official source, the Pakistani Army (Military 
Establishment) was quoted a total of 22 times. Of the 21 unofficial Pakistani sources 
quoted a total of 27 times in this period, the Pakistani media (Private Media) appeared 
10 times, Average Citizens, 7 times, Experts, 6 times and Guerrillas, 4 times. 
Kashmiri Sources 
Unofficial sources were more than double (21) the number of official sources (10) 
for Kashmiris in this phase of the period under study. Average Citizens (20) again 
emerged as the most frequently quoted Kashmiris followed by separatists (8). Among the 
official sources, Political Leaders constituted by the All Parties Hurriyat Conference, an 
umbrella organization of Kashmiri separatist parties, was quoted a total of 15 times, 
followed by leaders at 3 times. 
U.S. Sources 
A total of 29 official U.S. sources were quoted 81 times in this period with the 
U.S. Government or Civilian Establishment remaining the most frequently used source. 
Officials were quoted 37 times, the President, 8 times, diplomats, 5 times, and experts, 5 
times. The White House (8) and the Secret Service (7) emerged as the other two official 
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sources of information. Experts (18) were the most frequently cited unofficial U.S. 
sources. 
Other Sources 
Official sources (13) were more numerous than unofficial sources (8) for this 
category. Although diplomats (18) emerged as the most frequently cited sources among 
other parties involved in the conflict, there was no clear majority among the unofficial 
sources. 
 
Sources used from 2002-2003 
A total of 349 sources were used in the fourth and final phase of the coverage of 
the Kashmir conflict by The New York Times, The Washington Post and the Los Angeles 
Times. Of these, 126 or 36 percent were Indian, 73 or 21 percent were Pakistani, 68 or 19 
percent were Kashmiri, 58 or 16 percent were American and 24 or 7 percent others. Table 
12 demonstrates the relative distribution of sources according to their affiliations. 
Indian Sources 
The number of official Indian sources for the final phase of the 15-year period 
under study was 105. The Indian Government or Civilian Establishment was used as a 
source of information 143 times, with officials being quoted 80 times; ministers, 
including the Prime Minister, 58 times; and spokespersons, only 5 times. Among the 
ministers, the defense minister was quoted the highest number of times (28) while the 
prime minister was quoted 12 times. Quoted 27 times, the Indian military or Military 
Establishment was the second most frequently cited official source of information for 
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the U.S. media. Army spokespersons were quoted 10 times while Indian intelligence 
sources emerged as the third most commonly used source (17). Unofficial Indian sources 
were only 21 of whom Experts emerged as the ones cited most regularly (16) followed by 
the Indian media or Private Media (6) and finally, Average Citizens (6). 
Pakistani Sources  
A total of 53 official sources were quoted 109 times in this phase, with the 
Pakistani Government or Civilian Establishment being the most important source of 
information. The Pakistani president was quoted a total of 44 times; officials were quoted 
27 times; spokesman, 12 times; and ministers, 9 times. The Pakistani Army or Military 
Establishment was quoted only 8 times. Of 20 unofficial sources, the Pakistani media 
(National Media) were quoted 12 times, Extremist groups 11 times, Experts, 7 times 
and Average Citizens, 5 times. 
Kashmiri Sources 
Although official sources (20) are less than half the number of unofficial ones 
(48), there is an increase in official sources from the previous two periods. The elected 
government of Jammu and Kashmir is the most commonly cited official source (18), and 
together with the Jammu and Kashmir Police (7) represent the Local Government. 
Political Leaders, and specifically the APHC, were quoted 6 times. Of the unofficial 
sources, Average Citizens (39) again emerge as the most frequently quoted sources 
among the Kashmiri people, followed by Separatist Leaders (19), Human Rights 
Groups (13) and Experts (4).  
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Table 12: Distribution of Sources in 2002-2003 
 
Aff. Official No. Unofficial No. Total % 
India 1. Civilian Establishment 
• officials 
• ministers 
-- Defense Minister 
-- Prime Minister 
• spokespersons 
2. Military Establishment 
• spokespersons 
• intelligence 
105 1. Experts 
2. Private 
Media 
3. Average 
Citizens 
21 126 36
Pakistan 1. Civilian Establishment 
• Pervez Musharraf 
• officials 
• spokesman 
• ministers 
2. Military Establishment 
• Pakistani Army 
53 1. Private 
Media 
2. Extremist 
Groups 
3. Experts 
4. Average 
Citizens 
 
20 73 21
Kashmir 1. Local Government 
• state government 
• Police 
2. Political Leaders  
• All Parties 
Hurriyat 
Conference 
20 1. Average 
Citizens 
2. Separatist 
leaders 
3. Human 
Rights Groups 
4. Experts 
48 68 19
U.S. 1. Civilian Establishment 
• Secretary of State  
• Officials 
• Deputy Secretary 
of State 
• diplomats 
• President 
2. Military Establishment 
50 1. Private 
Media 
2. Experts 
8 58 17
Other 1. diplomats 14 1. Private 
Media 
• Reuters 
10 24 7
Total  242  107 349 100
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U.S. Sources 
The number of official sources (50) for the fourth period is overwhelmingly 
higher for the U.S. than the number of unofficial sources (8). Representatives of the U.S. 
Government or Civilian Establishment are quoted a total of 113 times with the two most 
frequently quoted sources being the Secretary of State Colin Powell (27) and officials 
(27) signifying high-profile U.S. involvement in the region in the final phase of the 
period under study. While the Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage was quoted 17 
times, diplomats were quoted 8 times and the president was quoted 6 times. The U.S. 
military was the second most commonly used American official source but was only 
quoted 14 times. Among unofficial sources, the Private Media were quoted 4 times and 
Experts, 3 times. 
Other Sources 
Diplomats were the most commonly used official sources of information (16) 
whereas Private Media (11), especially the Reuters News Agency were the most 
frequently cited source among unofficial sources. 
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Chapter 5 
Discussion 
 
 The preceding chapter identified the frames that the U.S. media, represented by 
The New York Times, The Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times, have used in their 
coverage of the Kashmir conflict and the parties involved in it. It also listed the sources – 
official and unofficial – that have been used to cover the events in Kashmir and also their 
relative distribution among the various parties in the conflict. This chapter discusses the 
changes that have occurred in the frames reported in the previous chapter over the 15-
year period stretching from January 1, 1989 to December 31, 2003. It also describes the 
frames that have had an overwhelming presence in this coverage and the major sources 
the three media have cited in their coverage. In addition, it seeks to explain these 
conclusions by relating them to the events occurring in Kashmir, in the Indian 
subcontinent and in the world. Finally, this chapter provides the implications of this 
study’s findings and conclusions on future mass media research. 
 
Changing Frames 
 In order to answer the first research question, which was whether and how frames 
used in the coverage of the Kashmir conflict and parties to it have changed in the 15-year 
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period of study, the study compared the relative prominence of major and minor frames 
in the coverage of each “subject” over the four phases into which the entire period was 
divided. The results of the comparison, detailed in the following paragraphs, suggest that 
the frames indeed have changed throughout the period of coverage under study and the 
changes seem to be related to local, regional and global developments. 
 
Coverage of the Conflict 
 In the first two periods of its coverage, spanning from 1989 to 1998, the conflict 
in Kashmir is framed as a movement in which the citizenry is portrayed as rising in revolt 
against a ruling power and trying to separate itself from that power. This is conveyed by 
the prominence of the Internal Revolt frame among nouns, the Mass-based Action 
frame among the modifiers and the Growing Unrest frame among verbs. In the last two 
periods of the coverage, stretching over 1999 till the end of 2003, the frame that emerges 
is that of an ongoing conflict in which the concerned parties are engaged in physical 
violence against each other. This is conveyed through the use of words that form the 
Physical Violence and Conflict frame for nouns, the Long and Dangerous Conflict for 
the modifiers and once again Growing Unrest for the verbs. A glance at Table 3 shows 
the frames that dominate the last two phases were minor in the first two phases whereas 
the frames that were major in the first two phases, conveying the goal of the Kashmiri 
movement – freedom or separation from India – are relegated to the background in the 
last two phases. 
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Table 13: Dominant Frames for the conflict
Period Dominant Frames 
1989-1990 Mass-based Action, Growing Unrest 
1991-1998 Internal Revolt, Mass-based Action, Growing Unrest 
1999-2001 Physical Violence, Conflict, Long & Dangerous Conflict, Growing 
Unrest 
2002-2003 Outside Interference, Physical Violence, Conflict, Disagreement, 
Long and Dangerous Conflict 
1989-2003 Warfare 
 
 The last two phases also show the emergence of the Terrorism, Outside 
Interference, Religious Identity and Disagreement frames. Together with the focus on 
ongoing violence in the last two phases, these frames convey the idea that the conflict, 
engendered by a dispute over the region between India and Pakistan, was increasingly 
driven by people from outside Kashmir who had a strong Islamic identity and who were 
carrying out activities that could be labeled terrorist. 
 
Coverage of the Region 
In the first two phases, the Kashmir region is identified as a Political Entity – as 
a state within the Indian union – a description that takes the backseat in the last two 
phases. In the first two phases, the goal of the armed movement in Kashmir – separation 
from India – is evident and therefore it follows that Kashmir is referred to as a part of 
what its people want to break away from. Complementing the greater focus on the 
ongoing violence and the labeling of the Kashmir issue as more of a dispute between 
India and Pakistan and less of a separatist movement in the last two phases, Kashmir is 
identified more by the Geographic Entity and Disagreement frames. However, in all 
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phases, Religious Identity remains a prominent frame signifying that an emphasis was 
placed on the fact that Kashmir was a Muslim region and therefore different from the rest 
of India that in general the reports described as Hindu. 
Table 14: Dominant Frames for the region
Period Dominant Frames 
1989-1990 Political Entity, Geographic Entity, Religious Identity 
1991-1998 Geographic Entity, Political Entity, Religious Identity, Disagreement 
1999-2001 Geographic Entity, Disagreement, Religious Identity 
2002-2003 Geographic Entity, Disagreement, Religious Identity, Political Entity 
1989-2003 Religious Identity 
 
 
Coverage of Kashmir and Kashmiris 
 In all four phases of coverage, the frames for Kashmiris remain largely the same – 
militants and guerrillas (Armed Combatants) belonging to Islamic groups (Religious 
Identity and Organized Activity) fighting through violent means (Violent Protester) to 
separate Kashmir from India (Mass-based Action, Separatist Rebels and Internal 
Revolt). The only changes that occur are in the relative prominence of the Ordinary 
Kashmiris frame in the four phases of coverage. In the first phase, the ordinary people of 
Kashmir protesting through non-violent means have a high presence in the coverage. In 
the second and third phases, they are relegated to the sidelines by the activities of the 
armed militants who killed, massacred, bombed and kidnapped their way into a greater 
presence in the media. Ironically, the reasons they cited for committing these violent 
activities was to draw greater international attention to their struggle to break away from 
India (Schofield, 2003). The Ordinary Kashmiris frame makes a comeback in the fourth 
  87
phase along with Civilian Government frame indicating the start of a political process in 
Kashmir after elections in and formation of a new state legislature. 
Table 15: Dominant Frames for Kashmir and Kashmiris 
Period Dominant Frames 
1989-1990 Armed Combatant, Ordinary Kashmiris, Mass-based Action, 
Violent Protester, Non-violent protester 
1991-1998 Armed Combatant, Separatist Rebels,  Organized Activity, 
Internal Revolt, Violent Protester, Non-violent protester 
1999-2001 Organized Activity, Armed Combatant, Mass-based Action, 
Violent Protester, Non-violent protester 
2002-2003 Armed Combatant, Civilian Establishment,   Ordinary Kashmiris, 
Violent Protester, Non-violent protester 
1989-2003 Religious Identity 
 
 
Coverage of India and Indians 
 In the first two phases of the conflict, the frames used for India portray it as a 
nation using its Military Establishment to crush the separatist movement of the people 
of Kashmir (Violent Repressor). These two frames, combined with the dominant frames 
for the conflict describing it as a separatist movement and the Kashmiris identifying them 
as armed militants fighting for freedom from India in the first two phases, create the 
master frame of a violent confrontation between the government and armed forces of 
India and the people of Kashmir. 
 However, this frame is displaced in the last two phases, with the emphasis shifting 
from the people of Kashmir to the Pakistanis as the chief opponents of India. In the third 
and fourth phases, India emerges as a nuclear-armed country (Nuclear Risk frame) 
fighting (Continuing Warfare frame) its nuclear-armed opponent, Pakistan, in Kashmir, 
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which is a region of dispute between them (Disagreement frame), through its armed 
forces (Military Establishment). Demonstrating this shift in focus from the people of 
Kashmir to Pakistan as the main Indian adversary is the decline of the Violent Repressor 
and Law and Order Maintainer frames for India. Through all four phases, the government 
of India (Civilian Establishment) continues to present its case in the diplomatic arena 
(Diplomatic Entity, Conciliatory Posturing, and Aggressive Posturing) but its military 
activities are highlighted more than its diplomatic activities, perhaps because of the 
constant presence of the Indian military and paramilitary units in the Kashmir region.  
Table 16: Dominant Frames for India and Indians
Period Dominant Frames 
1989-1990 Military Establishment, Civilian Establishment, Violent Repressor, 
Law & Order Maintainer 
1991-1998 Military Establishment, Civilian Establishment, Violent Repressor, 
Law & Order Maintainer 
1999-2001 Military Establishment, Civilian Establishment, Nuclear Risk, 
Diplomatic Entity – Conciliatory and Aggressive Posturing, 
Continuing Warfare 
2002-2003 Military Establishment, Civilian Establishment, Nuclear Risk, 
Diplomatic Entity – Conciliatory and Aggressive Posturing, 
Continuing Warfare 
1989-2003 Religious Identity 
 
The portrayal of India as a nuclear-armed nation coupled with an emphasis on its 
ongoing violent conflict with Pakistan as well as the emergence of Nuclear Risk as one 
of the minor frames for the conflict in phases three and four, point to an attempt to frame 
the conflict and region as a nuclear time bomb, a reiteration of the opinion held and 
expressed frequently by Western governments and international relations experts. An 
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example of the reportage following the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in 
May 1998 is as follows (Burns, 1998, p.1): 
In May, the stakes in the conflict rose immeasurably when first India and then 
Pakistan conducted nuclear tests and declared themselves nuclear powers. 
The tests raised worldwide alarm, with President Clinton and other leaders 
appealing to India and Pakistan to settle their differences over Kashmir to prevent 
the territory from becoming the flashpoint of a nuclear war. 
 
Coverage of Pakistan and Pakistanis 
 As was the case with India, the entire period of coverage has four recurring 
frames for Pakistan: the Civilian Establishment of Pakistan engaged in the activities of a 
Diplomatic Entity including both Conciliatory and Aggressive Posturing, a Military 
Establishment that is a Violent Neighbor to India and a country that is an Active 
Supporter of the Kashmiri separatist movement. Coinciding with the greater depiction of 
the events in Kashmir as a separatist rebellion waged by armed militants in the first two 
phases, Pakistan is described more as aiding that struggle with arms, training and money 
than as involved in a military direct dispute with India.  However, as the narrative shifts 
to the characterization of the conflict as ongoing violence in the last two phases, Pakistan 
is increasingly framed as an active participant and not just a supporter. 
Introduction of the Outside Interference frame and increase in the prominence of 
the Violent Neighbor frame in the third phase as well as greater focus on Military 
Establishment frame and the entry of the Militant Extremists frame in the fourth phase, 
bring Pakistan’s direct involvement to the fore in the last two phases. Reinforcing the 
greater recognition on the part of the United States and also on the part of the media of 
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Pakistan as home to several militant Islamic organizations that were engaged in terrorist 
activities, is the presence of the Cracking Down frame in the fourth phase. 
Table 17: Dominant Frames for Pakistan and Pakistanis
Period Dominant Frames 
1989-1990 Civilian Establishment, Military Establishment, Active Supporter, 
Diplomatic Entity 
1991-1998 Civilian Establishment, Active Supporter, Diplomatic Entity, Violent 
Neighbor  
1999-2001 Civilian Establishment, Military Establishment, Conciliatory 
Posturing, Violent Neighbor, Active Supporter 
2002-2003 Military Establishment, Militant Extremists, Nuclear Risk, Cracking 
Down, Conciliatory Posturing 
1989-2003 Religious Identity 
 
A point to note here from the journalistic practices standpoint is that the actions 
that the different subjects are engaged in and the changes in these actions are more 
strongly conveyed through the verbs used for them as compared to adjectives and nouns. 
This might be because journalists paint a more colorful picture through the verbs they use 
to describe an action done by any actor in the story than through nouns because verbs can 
be used with greater variety and accuracy in the painting of a picture. 
 
Coverage of the United States and Others 
 The Americans do not have a very high profile in the first two phases and come 
across as Concerned Advisors in the last two phases engaged in diplomatic parleys with 
India and Pakistan. As far as “Other” parties are concerned, the increased presence of 
human rights groups (Human Rights Concerns and Critical Observer) in the second 
phase complements the Kashmiris separatists fighting the militarily repressive Indian 
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government frame that characterized the conflict in the first two phases. At that time, 
international human rights organizations accused the Indian government of committing 
human rights violations against Kashmiri civilians. In the third and fourth phases, 
reinforcing the growing participation of outsiders (Outside Interference) and Pakistanis 
(Militant Extremists and Violent Neighbor) in the ongoing violence in Kashmir is the 
presence of the Foreign Soldiers frame. The media coverage highlights fighters from 
outside Kashmir with a strong Religious Identity fighting to separate Kashmir from 
India (Separatist Rebels frame). 
Table 18: Dominant Frames for Other Parties 
Period Dominant Frames 
1989-1990 News media 
1991-1998 Human Rights Concerns, Concerned Advisor, Critical Observer 
1999-2001 Foreign Soldiers, Religious Identity, Outside Interference, Violent 
Outsiders 
2002-2003 Foreign Soldiers, Concerned Advisor 
 
 
Dominant frames 
In answer to the second research question, which was what have been the 
dominant frames in the U.S. media coverage of the Kashmir and to what extent have 
these frames reflected such major themes as religion, armed conflict, U.S. national 
interest, and threat to world peace, this study found that the two frames that have been 
present throughout the 15-year period investigated, have been the Warfare frame for the 
conflict reflecting the theme of armed conflict and the Religious Identity frame for the 
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Indians, the Pakistanis and the Kashmir region and the Kashmiris reflecting the religion 
theme.  
The Warfare frame has been constructed from only the word “war” and since it 
emerged as the most prominent frame in three of the four phases into which the period of 
study was divided, it follows that the U.S. media have placed a great emphasis in 
highlighting the Kashmir conflict sometimes as a “guerrilla” or “separatist war” but 
mostly as a conflict that has sparked wars in the past between India and Pakistan and has 
the potential of turning into a “wider war” or even a “nuclear war.” 
This frame emerged as a dominant because in almost every news report on 
Kashmir, there is a standard or “boiler plate” description of the events that have taken 
place in the subcontinent since 1947, when India and Pakistan became separate nations, 
independent of the departing British colonial power. Following is a typical description of 
the nature of relations between India and Pakistan (Burns, 1994, p.6A): 
…none deny that a new war, if it began, would almost certainly center on 
Kashmir. 
 
In two of the three wars the two countries have fought since Britain's departing 
colonial rulers partitioned the Indian subcontinent in 1947, creating Hindu-
dominated India and Muslim-ruled Pakistan, Kashmir has been the battleground. 
 
“No issue between them so focuses the passions -- of religion, of nationalism, and 
of pride -- that have made each, for the other, an object of enduring dislike and 
mistrust.  
  
Due in large part to this recurring description of the two nations’ historical 
conflict over Kashmir, the Warfare frame emerges as dominant. These narratives tie in 
directly to the rules of journalistic writing that entail a recounting of the background in 
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order to place the events in context for the reader. This is particularly true of events and 
issues that are covered sporadically or are far removed from the reader’s experience as 
the Kashmir conflict undoubtedly is for an American audience.  
The second dominant frame that emerges from an overview of the entire period 
analyzed in this research is the Religious Identity frame used to describe the conflict, the 
region and the three parties involved – Indians, Pakistanis and Kashmiris. Whereas India 
has been described as a “Hindu” or a “predominantly Hindu” country, Kashmir has been 
described as a Muslim or “Muslim dominated” region, and Kashmiris as “majority 
Muslim and Pakistan as an “Islamic” or “Muslim” country.  
Since the turn of the year, and especially in the last two weeks, the Kashmir 
Valley, a Muslim region seeking independence from predominantly Hindu India, has 
been engulfed by a storm of violence. (Gargan, 1993, p1) 
 
Kashmir, a territory about the size of Utah with a population whose majority is 
Muslim, is wedged between India, Pakistan and China. Its ownership has been disputed 
between predominantly Muslim Pakistan and largely Hindu India since both gained 
independence in 1947. The two nations -- the world's newest nuclear powers -- have 
fought two of their three wars over Kashmir. (Bearak, 2000, p8A) 
 
Although it is a fact that Pakistan was founded as a homeland for the Muslims of 
South Asia, India was established as a secular democracy where religion is a private and 
the Indian Constitution guarantees ever citizen the right to practice and preach his or her 
faith. In the past 15 years, there has been a rise in Hindu fundamentalist forces on the 
national scene in India, but India’s refusal to let go of Kashmir is rooted in its secular 
identity (Cohen, 2003, Dixit, 2002). According to Cohen (2003), India “finds it difficult 
to turn over a Muslim majority region to a Muslim neighbor just because it is Muslim” 
(p. 46, emphasis in original). However, the constant juxtaposition of the three parties and 
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their religious majorities seems to convey the impression that the demographics of India 
have a major influence on India’s attitude towards the dispute and the nature of its 
policies in Kashmir. However, it can be argued that describing Pakistan as a Muslim 
country and its claim to the territory of Kashmir as rooted in religion is justifiable since 
the country was founded as an Islamic nation and because it considers Kashmir as 
legitimately a part of Pakistan because the population in Kashmir is mainly Muslim 
(Cohen, 2003, Dixit, 2002, Schofield, 2003).  
The identification of the parties by their religion might be related again to the 
need for explaining in a simple manner a complex situation playing out in part of the 
world that for most American readers would arguably be remote. The assigning of 
religious motivation to the actions of the parties concerned may be the result of an 
attempt  to provide a simple explanation to a very nuanced and multi-layered conflict that 
has persisted through five and half decades.  
Threat to U.S. national interests is reflected in the great attention paid to the 
conflict in the last phase (2002-2003) as reflected by the quantum leap in coverage of the 
Kashmir conflict and the tensions between India and Pakistan in all three newspapers 
from 2001 to 2002 (see Table 1). At that time, the U.S. was actively pressuring Pakistan 
to ban extremist Islamic groups based in Pakistan because after the events on September 
11, 2001, these groups were seen as a threat to the security of Americans. This concern is 
also reflected in the high prominence of the Cracking Down frame among verbs used for 
Pakistanis in the last phase of the coverage. The increase in coverage was also related to 
the greater prominence of the frames reflecting a violent conflict in the latter two periods 
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(Long and Dangerous Conflict, Conflict, Physical Violence and Outside 
Interference) as opposed to a separatist movement because there was a massive military 
standoff between India and Pakistan in summer 2002 and coupled with the fears 
expressed about the possibility of a nuclear exchange, there is a clear presence of the 
threat to word peace theme in the frames. 
 
Sources 
 Past research has shown that the media tend to rely on official sources for 
information. In her content analysis of the The New York Times and The Washington 
Post, Dickson (1992) found that the two elite newspapers relied heavily on U.S. 
government officials for information on the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. One reason 
is that official sources are more easily accessible to journalists and this greater 
accessibility makes the job of news gathering more efficient. Another is that these 
sources are perceived to be more authoritative, with the information they provide 
considered to be factually accurate (Shoemaker and Reese, 1991; Entman, 1989; 
Dickson, 1992). 
Analysis of sources for the 15-year period of coverage of the Kashmir conflict 
reveals the same disproportionate reliance on official sources as compared to unofficial 
ones. In the 1989-1990 phase, the Civilian Establishments of India, Pakistan and the 
United States were quoted more than three times as often as their unofficial counterparts. 
In fact for Pakistan, this ratio was 12 to 1. This finding is in accordance with past 
research that suggests the greater reliance of news media on official, especially 
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government, sources. Among unofficial sources for these three countries, the Private 
Media were the most often cited source; this is not surprising, considering that these 
three nations have well developed press systems. Also, media organizations act as 
sources for each other and especially when covering a foreign country, journalists pay 
close attention to the domestic media, often picking up leads from them and then 
featuring their information in, or following this information up in their own stories. 
Only in the case of the Kashmiris is this trend reversed with a greater presence of 
unofficial sources, especially Average Citizens, in all fours phases of the coverage. 
Separatist and religious leaders have been the two other main groups of unofficial 
Kashmiri sources that have been cited in more than two phases of coverage. All three 
newspapers in this study were found to have carried extensive quotes from the ordinary 
people of Kashmir in many news-based analytical stories. For example: 
''They have made every Muslim a suspect,'' a businessman said of the Indian 
armed forces' attempts to subdue a fast-growing independence movement. ''We 
are all militants now.'' (Crossette, 1990, p. 1 A) 
 
"We have bullets from the left and bullets from the right, bullets from in front and 
bullets from behind," said an elderly Muslim cloth trader in Lal Chowk, a bazaar 
here. He whispered, "Everything we valued has been destroyed." (Burns, 1995, p. 
3) 
  
In the second phase, reflecting a growing concern with accusations of human 
rights violations made against India, Human Rights Groups feature prominently among 
unofficial sources, which are incidentally higher in number than official sources for the 
United Stats and the “Other” parties. India and Pakistan, however, continue to be 
represented by their respective Civilian Establishments. As compared to Indians and the 
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people of Kashmir, Pakistan and the United States maintain a low profile in the first two 
phases, an indication that the conflict at this time was mainly an Internal Revolt that 
India was trying to suppress by violent means (Violent Repressor).  
 In the third and the fourth phases, the profile of both Pakistan and the United 
States is higher than in the first two phases. In fact, Pakistani sources exceed in number 
even sources from Kashmir, with Pakistani Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf 
heading the list of Civilian Establishment sources from Pakistan. This seems to signify 
the greater concentration of power and authority in him, the central figure and face of 
Pakistan to the world community after 1999. In contrast, India continued to be 
represented heavily through its Civilian Establishment officials and elected 
representatives including the Prime Minister and his cabinet of ministers in the third and 
fourth phases.  
 Reflecting growing U.S. concern with the nuclear-armed status of India and 
Pakistan from 1999 to 2001 (Nuclear Risk) and its interest then in roping in Pakistan to 
hunt down Al Qaeda, the Civilian Establishment sources used from the United States 
become increasingly high-profile in the third and fourth phases of the media coverage of 
the Kashmir conflict. In fact, Secretary of State Colin Powell is the most frequently cited 
U.S. source from 2002 to 2003 implying the intense U.S. involvement in the South Asian 
region in the last phase. 
 In the final two phases, although the people of Kashmir still were represented by 
unofficial sources, mainly Average Citizens and Separatist Leaders, whose number 
was twice the number of official sources, there was a move towards quoting more official 
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Kashmiri sources, particularly officials of the elected Local Government and Political 
Leaders from the All Parties Hurriyat Conference, an umbrella organization of Kashmiri 
separatist political parties, signifying the start of a political process in Kashmir. Kashmiri 
human rights groups and experts also emerged as other unofficial sources indicating a 
greater consolidation of the Non-violent Protesters in Kashmir than in the past. 
 Therefore, in answer to the third research question, which was what have been the 
nature and affiliation of sources in the coverage of the Kashmir conflict, this study found 
that among official sources, Indian sources were the most frequently quoted followed by 
sources from Pakistan, the United States, Kashmir and “Other” parties. Among unofficial 
sources, those from Kashmir were the most frequently cited followed by those from 
India, Pakistan, the United States and finally, the “Other” parties. 
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Chapter Six 
Conclusions 
 
 This study has discovered and analyzed the frames through which the U.S. print 
media have reported on the Kashmir conflict. As discussed in the literature review section 
of this thesis, media construct social reality through the frames that they use. They 
construct these frames by singling out some features of subjects, developments or their 
environments, and emphasizing these features over others. In the case of their coverage 
of the Kashmir conflict, the U.S. print media, represented by The New York Times, The 
Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times, have chosen to highlight two aspects of the 
Kashmir conflict – religion and warfare.  
 Through their consistent use of religious descriptors for India, Pakistan and 
Kashmir, they have created a simplified version of the complex reality of the region – the 
desires of its people and the reasons for the tussle between India and Pakistan. The 
political reasons for the Kashmiri separatist movement – discontentment with corrupt 
regional governments, lack of adequate civic amenities and industrial development, 
unemployment, disillusionment with the electoral system, and anger at being 
shortchanged out of their semi-autonomous status in the Indian union – were never 
highlighted. Instead, the media chose the easy way out by labeling the conflict as 
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religious in nature, possibly because conflict over religion resonates with current 
American cultural frames. It can be argued that with Islam being considered a major 
threat to Western countries especially after the events on September 11, 2001, the U.S. 
media might increasingly resort to this kind of religious framing, particularly in cases 
where one of the parties involved subscribes to Islam. 
The second aspect of the reality constructed by the U.S. print media is that of a 
conflict that essentially is a war and can turn into a larger war or a nuclear war. While 
this frame does reflect the nature of the developments on the ground that were, it ties into 
two characteristics of U.S. media coverage of events in foreign counties. First, it confirms 
what previous studies have found – that U.S. media coverage of third world countries 
tends to be crisis-oriented defined as dissent, war, terrorism, crime, coups, assassinations 
or disasters (Shoemaker and Reese, 1991). The pattern visible in the coverage of the 
Kashmir conflict also reflects this tendency. When the separatist movement started in 
1989, since there were mass demonstrations, mass killings,  kidnappings and bombings, 
the conflict attracted a lot of U.S. media attention in one year from December 1989 to 
December 1990 (40 stories in The New York Times and 15 in The Washington Post). The 
coverage lagged in the eight-year period from 1991 to 1998 (33 stories in The New York 
Times and only 3 stories each in The Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times) 
because there were violent events happening in areas of the world that were of greater 
importance to the United States and consequently to its media – the crisis in the Middle 
east, Northern Ireland, Bosnia and later Kosovo – although killings, kidnappings and 
bombings continued unabated in Kashmir (Schofield, 2003). 
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 When India and Pakistan tested their nuclear weapons in 1998, nuclear-capable 
Western nations, including the United States, started expressing fears that there might be 
a nuclear war between India and Pakistan, in spite of the fact that India committed itself 
publicly to no first use of nuclear weapons. Despite repeated reiterations by Indian and 
Pakistani officials that neither country could afford a nuclear war and that the weapons 
actually decreased the possibility of even a conventional war and were mere deterrents, 
the U.S. media continued to quote U.S. and other Western government officials, 
including former President Bill Clinton and diplomats and experts, as saying that the 
Kashmir was a nuclear flashpoint. This reflects the imprint of power in media frames, 
with the United States emerging the clear winner in the framing of the Kashmir conflict 
by the U.S. media. The priorities and concerns of the United State were clearly reflected 
in the warfare frame that was employed throughout the period analyzed in this study, a 
fact that leads to the conclusion that the media in the U.S. reflect the agenda of the 
government when it comes to international relations.  
 Entamn (1989) has said that media frame the issues they cover not only by 
choosing to include certain aspects of reality but also by choosing to exclude some 
aspects, and that is clearly what the U.S. media have done regarding the Kashmir conflict 
by not including or emphasizing certain opinions and contentions. They have chosen to 
look at the conflict through the straitjacket of the U.S. government’s stance on the region 
and supplemented this stand by quotes from U.S. experts on this issue. They have not 
promoted to an equal extent the contentions of the Indian and Pakistani governments that 
the possibility of nuclear war between them is remote. Tying this analysis of the content 
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of U.S. media frames back to the initial argument that only crisis and bloodshed and 
possibility of a greater conflict in Third World countries get covered in the U.S. media, 
the number of stories in The New York Times jumped from 4 in 1998 to 24 in 1999, the 
year in which India and Pakistan fought their undeclared war in Kargil in Kashmir. The 
coverage again jumped from 2001 to 2002, when India and Pakistan massed nearly a 
million troops along the Line of Control in Kashmir (6 to 21 in The Washington Post, 5 to 
24 in the Los Angeles Times and 15 to 51 in The New York Times) reflecting once again 
that the possibility of violence on a larger and potentially catastrophic scale ensures 
coverage by the U.S. media. Another reason for the hike in coverage from 2001 to 2002 
was the growing involvement of the United States in the region through the George Bush 
administration’s aggressive attempts to include Pakistan in its coalition against terrorism 
and the Afghanistan war, clearly reflecting increased media coverage due to increased 
U.S. interest in the region.  
A shift that clearly demonstrated the influence of changing U.S.-India and U.S.-
Pakistan relations from 1989 to 2003 was the move towards greater recognition of 
Pakistan’s role in actively aiding the militants in Kashmir in terrorist activities, as a fact 
and not just an Indian allegation. The coverage which criticized the Indian government 
for its alleged human rights violations and labeled Indian allegations that Pakistan was 
training and arming Kashmiri militants as claims in the first two periods, changes to 
being critical of Pakistan for harboring Islamic terrorist organizations that committed 
violent acts in Kashmir. This shift can be attributed to the increasing closeness between 
the United States and India and to the U.S. government’s concern with American 
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security, once again reflecting the impact of power on media frames.  In conclusion, one 
can say that the U.S. media have constructed the reality of the Kashmir conflict by 
making selected attributes of the conflict salient and by highlighting in their text, problem 
definitions and causal interpretations advanced by the U.S. government. Also, confirming 
past findings on international news coverage by the U.S. media, this study shows that 
media coverage of the Kashmir conflict was crisis-oriented and reflected U.S. concerns in 
the region. 
 
Implications for Future Research 
 Media theorists, particularly Entman (1989, Gamson (1989) and Graber (1988),  
have conceptualized frames as being present in the communicator, the text, the audience 
and the culture, with the presence of frames in any one of these locations influencing 
their presence in another. Although this study did not look at the frames for the Kashmir 
conflict among the communicators, the audience and the culture, they no doubt had a 
great influence on the frames evident in the text. 
 The events in Kashmir were definitely covered because they were newsworthy 
from the perspective of the news value of “conflict,” which is arguably the news value on 
which the media place a great premium and which determines most, if not all, news 
content. Frames that reflected journalistic practices and socialization were once again the 
religion and warfare frames, both signifying an attempt to simplify reality and structure it 
in an inverted pyramid fashion, the need to provide superficial historical background and 
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boiler-plate descriptions to place the events in context for their readers, and also the 
media acceptance of the government “line” when it comes to foreign news coverage. 
Researchers have found that the mass media have priming effects, in that the 
repeated exposure of audiences to ideas and information in the media triggers related 
ideas and feelings in their minds. Salwen and Matera (1992) found distinct evidence of 
the second level agenda setting influence of the mass media in public perception of 
several foreign countries as dangerous places and as friends or enemies, which persisted 
even though media coverage of those nations had started changing, providing evidence of 
the enduring impact of repeated frames on the audience’s thinking about issues, or in this 
case, foreign countries. Drawing from their findings, one can argue that since the 
dominant frames that have characterized the conflict have been religion, with one of them 
being Islam, and warfare, the readers of the three newspapers in this study would 
undoubtedly perceive the Kashmir conflict as a potentially disastrous war involving 
parties that subscribe to different religions. Viewed in the context of the Middle East 
crisis between Palestinian Muslims and Israeli Jews as well as terrorist acts perpetrated 
by Islamic extremists in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Chechnya and Sudan, this might 
also add to the increasing demonization of Islam in America as a religion that perpetuates 
violence. 
The current study therefore could serve as a starting point for a second-level 
agenda setting study aimed at determining such issues as a) the perceptions of Americans 
regarding the Kashmir conflict; b) the level of correspondence of these audience frames 
with the mass media frames discovered in this study; and c) the persistence of these 
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media and audience frames. Such a study would add to the body of work about 
international news reporting and framing of international news as well as to the existing 
research on effects of frames present in media text on the audience.   
This emphasis on religion and warfare as the primary frames for the Kashmir 
conflict can also be tied to certain characteristics of American culture, the fourth location 
of frames identified by Entman (1989). American society has been found to be highly 
ethnocentric, and this tendency of Americans to concern themselves mainly with their 
domestic affairs is reflected in the low and essentially crisis-driven coverage given to 
international affairs and particularly events in Third World countries by the U.S. media. 
High ethnocentrism also breeds ignorance of other cultures and imposition of American 
interpretations on complex, multi-layered events occurring in other countries. These 
interpretations are evident in the media text and are maybe brought about by the 
journalists and imbibed by the audience, making it a somewhat cyclical process.  
Therefore, another area of research for which this study could serve as a base is an 
investigation into the frames regarding foreign countries – especially such South Asian 
countries as India and Pakistan – that are present in the American culture and how these 
might impact the frames communicated by journalists who cover events in these 
countries, editors who edit their reports, or the gatekeepers who select these reports for 
presentation to the public. A basic tenet of journalism is that its practitioners engage in 
writing for the perhaps rather specific audience of a particular mass medium. It follows 
that certain perceptions in the minds of reporters about what American readers would 
want to read might influence frames that these reporters would use in their coverage of 
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these countries. One major focus of future study could be the determination of the degree 
to which the knowledge of cultural and audience characteristics had an influence on the 
frames the reporters, editors, or gatekeepers presented in the stories on which this study 
focused. 
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Appendix A: Coding Sheet 
 
Date:______________________  Newspaper:______________________ 
Dateline:______________________________________ 
Headline:________________________________________________________ 
Sources: 
Type: Official=1, Unofficial=2 
 Official: Military, Diplomatic, Government, Political parties 
 Unofficial: Non-governmental, human rights groups, militant groups, religious  
 organizations, journalists, laypersons, media 
Affiliation: Indian=1, Pakistani=2, Kashmiri=3, U.S.=4, Other=5 
 
Name Position Organization Type Aff. No. 
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
 
Keywords: 
Type: Noun=1, Verbs=2, Adjectives=3, Adverbs=4 
Subject: Dispute=1, Region=2, Indians=3, Pakistanis=4, Kashmiris=5, U.S.=6, Other=7 
No.= Number of times the word appears in the article 
 
Word Type Sub No. Modifier Type Sub No. 
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
 
